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Article 4

PAST AND POTENTIAL USES OF EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH IN CIVIL RULEMAKING
Thomas E. Willging*
INTRODUCTION

In the words of an experienced observer of and participant in the
civil rulemaking process, a "group of elite lawyers and law professors
who acted with little empirical evidence"' drafted the original Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules).2 During the first fifty years after
adoption of the rules, rulemakers rarely commissioned or used empirical research to support their revisionsA Until the last decade or so,
* Senior researcher at the Federal Judicial Center. Since 1988, the author has
represented the Center at meetings of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and has
participated in a majority of the research discussed in this Article. Any views
expressed in this Article are, of course, his own and not necessarily those of the
Federal Judicial Center, the Advisory Committee, or any other entity in the judicial
branch.
The Honorable David Levi, chair of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
discussed his views on the subject of this Article in an interview with the author.
Professors Edward Cooper and Richard Marcus, reporter and special reporter,
respectively, to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules; the Honorable Fern Smith,
Director of the Federal Judicial Center; Russell Wheeler; James Eaglin; Joe Cecil; and
David Rauma each gave many helpful suggestions in commenting on a previous draft.
Any remaining deficiencies are the author's sole responsibility.
1 Richard L. Marcus, OfBabies and Bathwater: The Prospectsfor ProceduralProgress,
59 BROOy. L. REv. 761, 782 (1993); see also Paul D. Carrington, The New Orderinjudicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161, 165 (1991) (stating that the rulemakers worked
"in secret over 18 months" and that they allowed "only a brief period of public comment," thus creating a basis for inferring that they did not seek empirical research).
2 I use the term "Rule" in this Article to refer to one of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. If referring to any other rules, I will specifically designate the type of rule.
3 See Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of Procedure-ImpactStudies in the Administration ofJustic, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 13, 13 [hereinafter Rosenberg, Procedure-ImpactStudies] ("Empirical research on the functioning of procedural
rules has had a slowly growing impact on the litigation process.... Regrettably, the
examples of such impacts have not been numerous."). Most of the examples Professor Rosenberg cited were studies of the impact of existing rules and were not necessarily designed to inform rulemakers. Notable exceptions were the Federal Judicial
Center's case management study, which the Advisory Committee cited in support of
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those rulemakers, with rare but notable exceptions, 4 followed the lead
of the original drafters and promulgated rules without the benefit of
systematic empirical observation of the impact of current rules or em5
pirical testing of proposed rule revisions.
The tone set by the original rulemakers and their successors
came under attack in the late 1980s and early 1990s when commentators decried the lack of empirical support for major rule revisions relating to Rule 11 sanctions in 1983 and Rule 26(a) initial disclosures
in 1993.6 One commentator called boldly for a moratorium on
rulemaking and all other procedural change until a thorough, empirically focused study of past, present, and proposed procedural changes
the 1983 amendments to Rule 16, and Professor Rosenberg's Columbia Project, which
the Advisory Committee cited in support of the 1970 amendments to the discovery
rules. Id. at 25-27. For the Federal Judicial Center study, see STEVEN FLANDERS, CASE
MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DisTRIcr COURTS (1977).
For the Columbia Project, see WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DIScOVERY AND THE ADVERsARY SYSTEM (1968), and Maurice Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in FederalPretrialDiscoveiy, reprinted in 45 F.R.D. 479 (1969).
4 In addition to the examples cited supra note 3, a perusal of the committee
notes to the rules reveals the following two references to empirical work. Both references cite the same empirical study, but in different directions, demonstrating that
empirical research remains subject to differing interpretations by policymakers in the
context of specific issues and proposals.
In 1980, the Advisory Committee stated its belief that "abuse of discovery, while
very serious in certain cases, is not so general as to require such basic changes in the
rules that govern discovery in all cases. A very recent study of discovery in selected
metropolitan districts tends to support its belief." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee's notes (1980 amend.) (citing PAUL R. CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN &
MICHAEL J. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: Discov-

(1978)).
In 1983, the Committee adopted substantial changes to the discovery rules and
opened its note with the statement that "[e]xcessive discovery and evasion or resistance to reasonable discovery requests pose significant problems. Recent studies have
made some attempt to determine the sources and extent of the difficulties." FED. R.
Crv. P. 26(f) advisory committee's notes (1983 amend.) (citing PAUL R. CONNOtLY,
ERY

EDITH A. HOLLEMAN & MICHAELJ. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LrriGATIVE PROcEsS: DISCOVERY

(1978), and three additional studies).

5 See Rosenberg, Procedure-ImpactStudies, supra note 3, at 13.
6 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and ProceduralLaw Reform: A Callfor a
Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 844, 845 (1993) (stating that "amended Rule 11
was promulgated in a virtual empirical vacuum," and that "there was little relevant
empirical evidence" regarding disclosure); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience:
Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 810
(1991) (revealing that when Rule 26(a) was proposed for adoption there had been
"virtually no empirical study of the current practice of such informal discovery, the
efficacy of such experiences, or the results of informal discovery").
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could be completed. 7 Another commentator, equally bold, called,
equally boldly, for limiting rule changes to those supported by controlled experiments, that is, research in which cases would be assigned
randomly to a litigation context in which a proposed rule would be
applied or not.8 Yet another commentator criticized the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules's (Advisory Committee or Committee) failure, prior to the 1993 amendment to Rule 26(a), to investigate empirically the experience of district courts with local rules regarding
disclosure 9 and prophesized the demise of judicial rulemaking as we
then knew it, maintaining that politicization of the process could not
be avoided in the absence of empirical grounding for proposed rules
changes.' 0 Other commentators have called for explicit congressional
authorization to create a national body that would review proposed
"experimental" local rules and facilitate empirical evaluation of such
time-limited local "experiments."" In 1995, a self-study committee of
the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure (Standing Committee) urged the Advisory Committees to seek and use empirical data in making decisions about pro12
posed rules changes.

7 See Burbank, supra note 6, at 855.
8 See Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposalfor Restricted Field
Experiments, LAw & CoNrEMp. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67, 73; see also Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trialand OtherMethods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations,53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 367 (1986) ("If we are to experiment with
alternatives to trials, let us really experiment; let us propose testable hypotheses, and
test them.").
9 See generally Mullenix, supra note 6 (discussing informal discovery rules and the
rulemaking procedure).
10 See id. at 801 ("[T]he inevitable politicization of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee foreshadows the decline of that body's role in procedural rule-drafting.").
Professor Mullenix suggested that the Advisory Committee might have to forfeit the
pleasures of "genteel, deliberative rulemaking" and declared that "the question remains open whether the Advisory Committee is destined to go the way of the French
aristocracy." Id. at 802.
11 See A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1585-94 (1991); see also Carl Tobias, A Modest Reform for Federal
Procedural Rulemaking, LAW & CoNTEmp. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 283,
286-87. These authors do not appear to use the term "experiment" in the scientific
or technical sense of establishing both experimental and control groups to test a proposal. See infra text accompanying notes 20-39.
12 See SUBCOMM. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING TO THE COMM. ON RULES OF PRAaCCE,
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., A SELF-STUDY OF FEDERALJUDICIAL RULEMAKING, reprinted in 168 F.R.D. 679, 699 (1995) [hereinafter SELFSTUDY].
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After these critiques-and perhaps spurred by them' 3-the Advisory Committee1 4 often solicited and otherwise encouraged empirical
studies regarding proposed rules changes. Since 1988, the Committee
frequently has consulted the FederalJudicial Center (FJC or Center) 15
and occasionally contacted private research organizations 16 for assistance in examining the current operation of the rules. 17 Empirically
13 This Article does not attempt to trace the root causes of increased use of empirical data in rulemaking. In general, calls for empirical research appear to have
become an integral part of the policymaking culture. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels &
Joanne Martin, Punitive Damages, Change, and the Politics of Ideas: Defining Public Policy
Problems, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 71, 91 ("[T]he best way to define something as a problem
'in our profoundly numerical contemporary culture' is to measure it." (quoting
DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 136 (1988))).
14 The Advisory Committees on Criminal Rules, Bankruptcy Rules, Appellate
Rules, and Evidence Rules also have used empirical evidence on occasion, and this
Article will discuss some of those uses. The Standing Committee rarely initiates the
drafting of proposed rules. Recently, however, the Standing Committee has taken the
lead in researching the need for rules relating to attorney conduct and has commissioned empirical work to support that effort. See Daniel R. Coquillette & Marie Leary,
Working Papers of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure: Special Studies of Federal Rules Governing Attorney Conduct (Sept. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
15 The Federal Judicial Center is an agency of the judicial branch of the federal
government created by Congress in 1967 to, among other purposes, "conduct research and study of the operation of the courts of the United States, and to stimulate
and coordinate such research and study on the part of other public and private persons and agencies." 28 U.S.C. § 620(b) (1) (1994). Congress also authorized the
Center, if "consistent with the performance of the other functions set forth in this
section, to provide staff, research, and planning assistance to the Judicial Conference
of the United States and its committees." For a historical-political account of the creation of the Center, including the centrality, in the minds of both ChiefJustice Warren
and Administrative Office of the Courts Director Warren Olney III, of the proposed
Center's research function, see Russell R. Wheeler, EmpiricalResearch and the Politicsof
Judicial Administration: Creating the FederalJudicial Center, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1988, at 31, 31-53.
16 See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER, NICHOLAS M. PACE, BONITA DOMBAY-MooRE,
BETH GIDDENS, JENNIFER GROSS & ERIK I. MOLLER, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING
PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000); James S. Kakalik, Deborah R. Hensler, Daniel
McCaffrey, Marian Oshiro, Nicholas M. Pace & Mary E. Vaiana, Discovey Management:
FurtherAnalysis of the CivilJustice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 613
(1998). Both of the above studies were encouraged and used by the Advisory Committee in its deliberations on its 2001 proposals to amend Rule 23 and its 2000
amendments to the discovery rules, respectively.
17 In addition to soliciting empirical research, the Committee routinely contacts
national bar groups, such as the American Bar Association's Section of Litigation and
the American College of Trial Lawyers to obtain their views about proposed rules.
Interest groups routinely attend Committee meetings, monitor Committee actions,
and present testimony or informal commentary on proposed rules.
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trained staff of the Center, usually the author, attend Advisory Committee meetings and public hearings to provide information to the
Committee in regard to empirical questions that may arise in the
course of deliberations. Based on the author's perspective developed
in the course of representing the Center at Advisory Committee meetings and presenting Center research to the Committee, this Article
will discuss some of the advantages, disadvantages, potential benefits,
and distinct limitations of conducting empirical research to inform
the rulemaking process. For the most part, the Article draws on specific examples of research conducted during rulemaking. Typically,
the Center undertook the research discussed below at the request of
the Advisory Committee for the express purpose of examining empirical questions posed by rulemakers as they contemplated changes in
the rules.
Part I examines more closely the commentators' calls for
rulemakers to seek and use empirical data to inform their deliberations. It discusses the variety of empirical research designs that researchers might use to generate meaningful information. Most
importantly, Part I distinguishes experimental research designs, which
can produce powerful inferences about causal relationships, from
more limited designs, such as observational field investigations and
case studies.
Part II describes fourteen recent examples of the Advisory Committee's use of empirical research conducted at its behest. In the
course of describing the research, this Part explores specific instances
of linkages between the research and the proposed rules.
Part III reviews the examples described in Part II and discusses
patterns that emerge from recent uses of empirical research in drafting and promulgating amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Part III focuses on the timing of requests and reports, designs
used in conducting the research, the underlying research questions,
and the main purposes served by the requests. In addition, Part III
analyzes and summarizes outcomes of the rulemaking proposals and
notes any apparent relationship between the proposed rules and legislative proposals. It also explores elements of the current rulemaking
process that facilitate and limit the type of research that can be conducted, such as term limits for Committee members and chairs and
time limits on conducting the research.
Part IV analyzes the potential benefits of and limits imposed by
employing experimental research to support rulemaking. It asks what
conditions would permit experimental studies of proposed rules as
opposed to studies of the impact of rules already enacted. Specifically, this Part calls attention to the need for the Standing Committee
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and the Advisory Committee to consider seeking general congressional authorization to permit the Standing Committee to adopt experimental rules to test the prospective impact of a proposed rule
change before a final rule is considered. Part IV concludes with a call
for the Standing Committee and the various advisory committees to
consider revising the paradigm they use for adopting major rules
changes and to consider creating a mechanism for conducting experimental research in appropriately limited circumstances.
I.

WHAT Is

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND WHAT TYPES OF EMPIRICAL

RESEARCH HAVE COMMENTATORS SOUGHT FOR THE
RULEMAKING PROCESS?

"Empirical research" is used in this Article to refer to information
collected through systematic observation and experience (in contrast,
for example, to information derived through theory or logic).18 Ordinarily, one speaks of such experience and observation as research (as
opposed to anecdote) only if a researcher systematically selects representative or otherwise appropriate cases for study, documents the observations, and applies the same criteria to describing each separate
observation, generally using a predetermined set of questions, sometimes referred to as a research protocol, survey instrument, or
questionnaire.
Research typically involves testing hypotheses generated by previous research, by academic theories, or, in the Center's experience, by
policy questions of importance to the judiciary. Generally, an empirical statement is one that can be proven wrong. 19 Empirical research
designs encompass experimental research, quasi-experimental research, observational studies, and case studies. Research methods include surveys and focus groups. Empirical research can take place in
the field, in a laboratory, or even in a library setting. Samples of subjects to be studied can be selected on a random basis or for the convenience of the researcher. Empirical research can be reported on a
quantitative or qualitative basis. Those terms will be defined and discussed below, with examples.
18 See W. PAUL VOGT, DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS AND METHODOLOGY: A NoNTECHNICAL GUIDE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 95 (2d ed. 1999).
19 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) ("Scientific
methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they
can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other
fields of human inquiry." (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witness and Sufficiency of
Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation,
86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 645 (1992))).
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Research Design

1. Experimental Research
For purposes of this Article, the primary distinction to be drawn is
between experimental (including quasi-experimental) research designs and non-experimental research designs. The key element of a
controlled experiment is that it generally involves the random assignment of cases to experimental treatment and control groups in which
participants, including judges, will or will not be subject to the proposed rule, procedure, or program. 20 The goal is to assess whether a
particular treatment (embodied, for example, in a draft rule) has the
predicted effect. Random assignment to treatment and control
groups has the effect of making the groups equal before the treatment is applied.
Statistical methods allow the researcher to test the hypothesis
(generally framed in the negative, that the treatment does not work)
and state the probability that any observed differences in outcomes
can be attributed to charice and not to the treatment. If the number
of cases is sufficiently large, the researcher can speak of results as being statistically significant at a ninety-five percent level, the benchmark chosen by most scientists for making such a statement. 2 1 This
means that there is less than a one in twenty probability that a putative
causal relationship occurred by chance. 22 This quality of experimental research-"the extent to which the results of a study ...

can be

attributed to the treatments"-is generally referred to as internal validity. 23 Whether the results can be generalized or applied to other

contexts, which researchers denote as external validity, depends on
20

See FED. JUDICIAL

CTR., EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAv: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL

JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION

(1981).
21 See ANTHONY

IN THE LAW

17-18

PARTRIDGE & ALAN LIND, A REEVALUATION OF THE GIL APPEALS
22 (1983).
22 A finding of statistical significance, however, does not mean that a relationship
is necessarily important or meaningful. It simply means that enough cases were examined to rule out the effects of chance. See David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman,
Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83, 124 (2d
ed. 2000) (stating that "significant differences are evidence that something besides
random error is at work"). The terms "practical" or "substantive" significance refer to
the strength of a relationship. SeeVoGT, supranote 18, at 219, 283. In designing an
experiment and framing hypotheses, a researcher will generally structure the experiment so that the relationships to be tested are meaningful.
23 VOGT, supra note 18, at 143.
MANAGEMENT PLAN
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the extent to which the other situations are similar to the context in
24
which the research was conducted.
Experimental research can be conducted in the field or in a laboratory setting.25 A good example of a procedural field experiment is
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's 1974 implementation of a program for attorneys, before briefing and arguing an appeal, to participate in a mandatory conference with an attorney
employed by the court. The court worked with the FJC to construct
an experiment to test the program, which is called the Civil Appeals
Management Program (CAMP).
The court first identified all cases that might benefit from a
mandatory conference. To provide a comparative foundation for the
research, the court then mandated that a conference be held in a
portion of the cases (the experimental group) and not in the remaining cases (the control group).26 Using docket numbers, the court assigned the first case to a court attorney, the next case to another court
attorney, and the third case to the control group until a sufficient
number of cases were in the experiment. 27 Researchers then measured the effects of the program on the rate of settlement, the time
required for the appeals, the quality of briefs and arguments, and on
the attorneys' satisfaction with the program. 28 In comparing case out24 Id. at 105.
25 Laboratory research is beyond the scope of this Article. Social psychologists
and other social scientists have conducted extensive laboratory research that is highly
relevant to the legal system. For an overview of such research, see IRWIN A.
HOROWITZ, THOMAS E. WILLGING & KENNETH S. BORDENS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW

(2d ed. 1998). Journals, such as Law and Human Behavior; Psychology, Public Policy &
Law; and Law & Psychology Review, often publish the results of laboratory experiments
and literature reviews summarizing such results. For a recent example that illustrates
the scope of such research, see DennisJ. Devine, Laura D. Clayton, Benjamin B. Dunford, Rasmy Seying &Jennifer Pryce, Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of EmpiricalResearch
on DeliberatingGroups, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 622 (2001).
Some journals focus on publishing empirical work arising out of studies of the
legal system. They include the Journalof Legal Studies (a publication of the University
of Chicago Law School); Judicature(American Judicature Society); Jurimetrics: TheJournal of Law, Science, and Technology (Section of Science & Technology Law, American
Bar Association); Law & Socihl Inquiry (American Bar Foundation); and Law & Society
Review (Law & Society Association).
26 See PARTRIDGE & LIND, supranote 21, at 1-3. For earlier analyses that proved to
be less conclusive, see JERRY GOLDMAN, AN EVALUATION OF THE CIVIL APPEALS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM: AN ExPERIMENT IN JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1977), and Jerry
Goldman, The Civil Appeals Management Plan: An Experiment in Appellate ProceduralReform, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1209 (1978).
27 PARTRIDGE & LIND, supra note 21, at 23-24. Exceptions were made for excluded cases, consolidated cases, and cases related to an earlier appeal. Id. at 24-28.
28 Id. at 5-8.
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come information from the two sets of cases and data from surveys of
both sets of attorneys, researchers attempted to sever any association
with other known or unknown factors (such as the identity of the
judges, the type of case, and any local rules or practices) that might
affect the outcome. 29 The researcher could then identify the differences in the outcomes of the two sets of cases, apply the appropriate
statistical tests, and determine whether any differences are attributable to the mandatory conference.
The CAMP research experience suggests that experimental research, for all its benefits, may not be a sport for the short-winded.
The CAMP studies encompassed two separate data gathering operations and nonetheless yielded somewhat inconclusive results: FJC researchers suggested almost a decade after the program began that "a
balanced decision for most other courts of appeals would be to institute CAMP-like programs but not to go full speed. 3 0° Later experimental evaluation of a CAMP-like program in another circuit
produced a precise measure of the savings in judicial resources attributable to the program,3 1 giving the policymakers information from
which to make a judgment about whether a program that does the
work of approximately one appellate judge is justified.32 That study
took between three and four years from the time of the court's request for research until the Center provided final results to the
33

court.

Another form of experimental research uses a quasi-experimental
research design. In a quasi-experimental design, the researcher generally does not attempt to control the assignment of cases but does
attempt to manipulate variables to create two or more distinct groups
29
30

Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 11.

31

SeeJAMEs B. EAGLIN, THE PRE-ARGuMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN THE SIXTH

CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

(1990). That report evaluated a program begun in 1982.

Id. at 1. By 1990, variations of the CAMP program had been implemented in the
Second, Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits. Id. at 41. Currently, there
are court-staffed mediation or settlement conference programs in all of the courts of
appeals except for the Federal Circuit. JUDITH A. McKENNA, LAURAL L. HOOPER &
MARY CLARK, CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

26-32 (2000).

32 See EAGLIN, supra note 31, at 41-42 (standing for the proposition that the request was made in 1995).
33 See id. at 1. The Center provided interim results to the court on an ongoing
basis. The first request was in early 1985, and the Center communicated final results
to the court in February 1989. E-mail from James B. Eaglin, Research Division Federal Judicial Center, to Thomas E. Willging (Jan. 14, 2002).
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for comparing the effects of a treatment.3 4 For example, in studying
offers of judgment under Rule 68, an FJC researcher surveyed attorneys in two distinct sets of cases, those that had settled and those that
had been tried.3 5 Manipulating those variables allowed the researcher
36
to draw clear comparisons, but not make causal attributions.
Experimental research enables the researcher to assess whether
the treatment caused the behavior that was predicted at the outset of
the experiment. In the opinion of many researchers, an experiment
is the only research design that so enables the researcher.3 7 Others
disagree and assert that statistical methods can sometimes be used to
generate causal inferences based on an analysis of multivariate rela38
tionships, that is, relationships involving three or more variables.
Putting this debate to one side, one of the leading legal-social researchers has captured the consensus that " [w] ithout doubt, the most
powerful and reliable way to investigate the impact of a legal rule,
procedure, program, or other intervention is to conduct a controlled
3' 9
experiment.
Professor Rosenberg's summary of experimental field research
showed the methodology to have been rarely used outside the laboratory. In addition to the CAMP experiment, Rosenberg described four
other research projects that qualified as experiments. 40 Two of the
34

VOGT, supra note 18, at 230-31.

35

JOHN

E.

SHAPARD, LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF AMENDMENTS TO RULE

68,

FEDERAL

RULES OF CIVL PROCEDURE 3-5 (1995).
36 Id. at 5.

37 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 20, at 15 ("Experiments are designed to test
the cause-and-effect relationship [between two or more variables]."); VOGT, supra
note 18, at 35 ("Most people who use the term 'causal conclusion' believe that an
experiment... is the only design from which researchers can properly infer cause.").
38 See VOGT, supra note 18, at 35, 184.
39 Rosenberg, Procedure-ImpactStudies, supra note 3, at 14.
40 For other examples of experimental research and evaluations of programs in
the legal system, see id. at 17-19 (New Jersey experiment testing mandatory pretrial
conferencing for cost and quality differences); id. at 20 (Ontario experiment testing
mandatory pretrial settlement conference for impact on settlement rates); id. at
22-23 (Kentucky experiment with impact of judicial case management on the cost,
time, and quality of justice); and id. at 23-25 (North Carolina experiment assessing
impact of court-annexed arbitration program on cost, delays, and other factors).
Apparently using a restrictive definition of "true" experiments, Professor Walker
added two simulated laboratory experiments to the list. Walker, supra note 8, at 70 &
n.15 (citing Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Neil Vidmar, EmpiricalResearch on Offers of Settlement: A Preliminary Report, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1998, at 13, 13); id. at
n.16 (citing SAUL M. KAssIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE II SANCTIONS (1985)). For
some reason, Professor Walker did not classify his own laboratory experiments within
his definition of "true" experiments. See id. at 69 n.6. See generally JOHN THIBAUT &
LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURALJUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) (reporting
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studies involved state courts, and one involved a Canadian court.
None took place before 1960. Since 1988, the frequency of experimental field research appears to have increased somewhat but remains relatively infrequent in comparison with the nonexperimental
research approaches discussed in Part 11.41
Significantly, most or all of the experimental field research reported above relates to testing case management approaches or programs, such as the use of alteriative dispute resolution, pretrial
conferences, and appellate conferencing programs. None of the experimental studies focused on the workings of a single procedural
rule, such as the class action, discovery, or sanctions rules. While the
Rule 68 offer of judgment studies dealt with a single rule, that rule
works like a settlement program. Creating experiments to test rules
that are an integral part of the litigation process may raise issues that
do not occur when an entire program is applied to or withheld from
experimental and control groups. For example, to apply or not apply
the results of a series of laboratory experiments testing assumptions and hypotheses
related to adversarial and inquisitorial systems of justice). Perhaps the distinction is
that the latter set of experiments did not directly involve participants in the legal
system. For further discussion of the extent of laboratory experiments relating to the
legal system, see supra note 25.
41 A thorough account of experimental and nonexperimental research in relation to civil rulemaking would exceed the scope of this Article. Recent research products of the FJC and the RAND Corporation's Institute for CivilJustice suggest that use
of experimental methods has increased since 1988 but remains a modest portion of
the rulemaking-related research described in Part II. Note that all of the following
research relates to broad case management programs, such as mediation and offers of
judgment, rather than specific procedures, such as motions, sanctions, or other com-

ponents of the litigation process. See, e.g.,

EAGLIN,

supra note 31; JAMES S.

KAKALIK,

TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURAL A. HILL, DANIEL MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS
M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA, AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALU-

UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTIcE REFORM ACT 21 (1996) (describing random assignment to experimental and control groups in the Southern District of New York and
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania); E. ALLAN LIND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES:
AN EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A UNITED STATES DisTRaCr COURT
(1990) (reporting results of experimental study of arbitration in a single district
court); SHAPARD, supra note 35, at 3-5 (describing survey design for attorneys involved
in federal litigation in all Federal districts); DONNA STINSTRA, MOLLYJOHNSON & PAATION

TRICIA LOMBARD, REPORT TO THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS

ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM

Aar

OF

1990, at 215-54 (1997)

(describing experimental field study of the CJRA Early Assessment [Mediation] Program in the Western District of Missouri); see also Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay
Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1487,
1492-95 (1994) (describing the random assignment method used to study early neutral evaluation program in the Northern District of California).
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a modified class action, sanctions, or a disclosure rule to every other
case seems to require intruding into the litigation process in an extraordinary manner and imposing novel demands on judges and litigators. In addition, concerns about ethical and legal fairness may
inhibit experimental research. Such concerns will be addressed in
42
Part IV.
2.

Nonexperimental Observational Research

Nonexperimental observational research designs call for a researcher to observe subjects, often in a natural setting. 43 Most empirical legal research is of this type, whether the subjects be cases,
attorneys, or litigants. Specifying the empirical questions, formulating
research hypotheses, and creating written protocols add systematic
rigor to the enterprise. One type of observational research involves
examining legal documents or other legal proceedings and using a
research protocol to ask the same questions regarding each case file
or legal document. For example, in the FJC's empirical study of special masters, researchers examined docket sheets in a sample of cases
in which the court appeared to have considered appointing a special
master. In those cases, researchers reviewed the docket sheets and
materials in the court's file to determine whether an appointment was
made, under what authority, for what purpose, and so forth. 44
Observational research differs from experimental research in that
any testing of the effect of a treatment does not take place under conditions that the researcher controls. For that reason, nonexperimental observational designs generally cannot yield findings of causal
relationships among variables. Differences in the outcomes of various
types of cases, for example, may be caused by variables unrelated to
the type of case, such as the location of the court, the experience of
the attorneys, and, typically, a host of variables that are difficult to
identify and control.
Observational research, however, under certain conditions may
be used to generate findings that apply to an entire population of
cases, judges, attorneys, or other participants in the legal system. If a
sample of subjects has been selected randomly from the population,
the researcher can use statistical methods to calculate the extent to
42
43
44

See also infra text accompanying notes 383-93.
See VOGT, supra note 18, at 197-98.
See, e.g., THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., SPECIAL MASTERS'

INCIDENCE AND Acrnrrr.

REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND ITS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPECIAL MASTERS
STUDY].

81-83 (2000) [hereinafter FJC

SPECIAL MASTERS'
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which the findings pertain to the population as a whole. For example,
in the special master study mentioned above, Center researchers selected a random sample of a national population of civil cases that
contained docket entries referring to special masters. 45 Based on that
sample, the researchers were able to state with precise confidence
levels the estimated minimum and maximum rates at which federal
judges considered appointing a special master in various types of cases
46
during the study period.
Case Studies

3.

The case study represents another type of research design that
legal-empirical researchers sometimes use. The assumption is that
"the example (the 'case') is in some way .typical of the broader phenomenon,"47 but that is only an assumption. In addition, it is difficult
48
to generalize a case study to the broader universe of cases.
A case study should not be confused with the study of published
opinions in a given case. An empirical case study will generally involve
examining the documents in the litigation (including, but not limited
to, published opinions), interviewing attorneys and perhaps judges,
49
and examining all available sources of information about the case.
Case studies can advance knowledge of the legal process by providing
an intensive and detailed look at the processes used by attorneys,
judges, and courts to manage litigation. Similarities and differences
in approaches uncovered during case studies might provide hypotheses that researchers can explore further by using quantitative research
designs.
Some examples of case studies in civil litigation include research
on class action litigation. In one such study, researchers selected a set
of ten state and federal class action cases on the basis of their case type
(mass tort or consumer cases involving small individual losses),
whether they had been certified and resolved as class actions, whether
they had been substantially terminated, and whether the participants
45
46

Id.
See id. at 17-21 (providing a table showing incidence by the nature of suit and

text discussing confidence intervals); see also id. at 83-92 (providing a statistical discussion and a table showing confidence intervals for all nature of suit classifications).

47 VOGT, supra note 18, at 34.
48 See id. at 34-35.
49 See, e.g., S. ELIABETH GIBSON, CASE STUDIES OF MAss TORT LIMIrrED FUND CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENTS & BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS 9-11 (2000) (describing the
methods used to study the cases selected); Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation:
PostaggregativeProcedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475,
485-87 (1991) (discussing the use of comparative case studies in asbestos litigation).
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were willing to speak on the record with researchers.5 0 In another
study, the object was to compare bankruptcy and limited-fund class
action approaches to resolving mass tort litigation. 51 In these studies,
the small number of cases would limit the power of statistical tests,
and/or the absence of a control group would preclude making causal
statements. Including comparable cases may add a systematic element
and allow the researcher to identify and discuss similarities and differences in policy-relevant variables, such as the approach used by the
court to review a proposed class settlement.
Case studies may in some instances be the only research design
available for examining a phenomenon that occurs infrequently. In
those circumstances, a series of case studies may represent a powerful
research design. For example, a series of case studies recently examined mass tort settlement class actions. 52 At the outset of that
study, researchers had been able to identify only five recent class ac53
tions that could be described as mass tort settlement class actions.
Accordingly, that study should be seen as presenting data about the
universe of mass tort settlement class actions during the 1990s and not
just about a representative sample of such cases.
B. Research Methods
1. Surveys
Typically, the method of choice in both experimental and observational studies is a written survey, using an instrument such as a questionnaire that is administered systematically to the research subjects,
who may be judges, lawyers, litigants, or other participants in the legal
system. 54 Or, as mentioned above, the subject of the research may be
the case and its documents. Administering the survey may also take
the form of in-person interviews, telephone interviews, or examining
50 See
study
51
52
53
54

HENSLER ET

AL.,

supra note 16, at 138-39 (describing case selection for

of ten consumer and mass torts class action cases).
See GIBSON, supra note 49.
See JAY TIDMARSH, MAss TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS AcTiONS (1998).
Id. at 20-24
See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Thomas E. Willging & Donna Stienstra, The Fed-

eralJudicialCenter's Study of Rule 11, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. DIRECrIONS, Nov. 1991, at 3,
28-35 [hereinafter FJC Rule 11 Study] (conducting a survey of judges' experiences
with frivolous litigation and their opinions regarding Rule 11 sanctions); Thomas E.
WilIging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An EmpiricalStudy of Discovery and DisclosurePractice Under the 1993 FederalRule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525,

528-29 (1998) [hereinafter FJC Disclosure & Discovery Study] (conducting a survey of
attorneys about experiences in terminated federal cases and opinions about proposed
reforms).
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the case file and documents. Administering a written. questionnaire
may involve using electronic media, such as the Internet or facsimile
transmission, to distribute the survey and record responses.
2.

Focus Groups

Judges and other legal policymakers often need reliable information about the needs and interests of litigants. Rarely do non-attorney
litigants participate in formal hearings on proposed rules changes. To
formulate hypotheses or to reach tentative qualitative conclusions
about a subject, researchers sometimes employ focus groups, collections of six to twelve individuals to discuss a particular subject through
a structured interview conducted by an experienced researcherfacilitator. 55 For example, when the Advisory Committee asked the
Center to develop illustrative plain language notices for use in class
actions, the Center used focus group techniques to identify typical potential class members' understandings of class actions, 5 6 legal forms,
legal terminology, and other aspects of notice.5 7 Focus groups might
about the impact of court proalso be useful in gathering information
58
cedures on litigants or jurors.
3.

Literature Reviews

One additional method deserves comment even though it does
not involve conducting original empirical work. A literature review
consists of a "systematic survey and interpretation of the research findings (the 'literature') on a particular topic .... ,,5"Providing background data on a subject that has been studied empirically in
laboratory experiments and otherwise, such as the effects ofjury size
on jury decisionmaking, gives the policymaker the perspectives of social scientists without the need for a major study. For example, to
support the Advisory Committee's recent examination of discovery,
55 See VoGT, supra note 18, at 114.
56 Participants were screened with the goal of obtaining a group that would have
the capacity to understand such notices and would be challenged by the task. For
example, each member of the group had no less than a high school education and no
more than a college education. Those who had been involved in litigation or were
working for a law firm were excluded.
57 For an overview of the Center's work, see the FJC's website, http://www.oc.gov.
"Class Action Notices" information can be found at this website by accessing the "Current FJC Activities" page.
58 See generally RICHARD A. KREUGER & MARY ANNE CASEY, Focus GROUPS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR APPLIED RESEARCH (3d ed. 2000) (presenting a guide and reference
manual for the use of focus groups in research purposes).
59 VOGT, supra note 18, at 163.
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the Center conducted a thorough review of empirical research on the
60
subject.
C. Research Setting
Field research refers-to research that takes place in a "naturally
occurring" setting "that is not a laboratory or library. '6 1 A field experiment is one type of field research, and observational research is often
also referred to as field research.
D. Sampling
In most types of empirical research, the goal is to study a sufficiently large sample of a population to enable the researcher to make
statistically sound inferences about the total population from which
the sample was drawn (for example, a "survey").62 However, in some
observational field research, the researcher may need to select cases
or other objects of study other than randomly. For example, the random selection of cases might produce an insufficient number of opportunities to observe the particular object of interest within the time
and budget allocated for the research. Researchers refer to a sample
selected on the basis of available resources as a convenience sample to
distinguish it from a random sample. Field studies based on a convenience sample do not allow the researcher to generalize, that is, to
make statements about the entire population under consideration.
Often, the point of such empirical research is simply to observe and
describe systematically the phenomenon of interest. Such descriptive
research may also generate hypotheses for later testing.
The Center's research on class actions is a good example of observational field research based on a convenience sample. 63 The study
60 SeeJudith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REv. 785, 787 (1998). Another example is the Center's literature
review summarizing both social science and legal materials for the Mass Tort Working
Group, which the ChiefJustice created at the behest of the Advisory Committee. E.g.,
THOMAS

E.

WILLGING, APPENDIX C: MASS TORTS PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS:

TO THE MASS TORTS WORKING GROUP,

CIVIL

in

A

REPORT

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON

RULES AND THE WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE

UNITED STATES AND TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,

reprinted in

187 F.R.D. 328 (1999).
61 VOGT, supra note 18, at 111.
62 See, e.g., id. at 286.
63 See Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, An Empirical
Analysis of Rule 23 To Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74 (1996)
[hereinafter NYU Empirical Analysis] (surveying class action case files in terminated

cases in four federal districts). The original version of the study, with a complete set
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could have been based on a sample of class actions filed nationwide,
but considerable time, logistical support from clerks' offices and computer systems administrators, travel, and personnel resources would
have been required to study cases spread across ninety-four federal
districts. Center researchers instead chose to examine cases in four
districts that exhibited high levels of class action activity. Recognizing
that these courts may not be representative-indeed, they were selected precisely because they showed the promise of having an uncharacteristically high number of class actions-the researchers had
to caution the reader that "[e]ach district should be viewed as a separate entity and the data from the four districts should be viewed as
' 64
descriptive-four separate snapshots of recent class action activity.
By focusing on four courts with high reported rates of filing, Center
researchers and the Advisory Committee traded the ability to generalize about class actions for the ability to collect data and report their
findings within approximately one year from the date the Advisory
Committee requested the study.
E.

Measurement

Empirical research can be further divided into quantitative and
qualitative studies. The Center's class action study described above
presents a good example of a quantitative observational field study.
Researchers examined approximately four hundred class action case
files in cases denominated as class actions that terminated within a
two-year period and systematically recorded information about numerous variables. 65 Similarly, the Center conducted an extensive
study of Rule 11 sanctioning activity in five federal district courts that
were selected because their computerized dockets facilitated data col66
lection on Rule 11 cases.
Qualitative field research often uses the case study design to examine in depth the manifestation of a particular phenomenon in a
single case or set of cases. Interviewing judges, attorneys, and other
participants in the legal system is a typical method for eliciting qualitative information.
of figures, tables, and appendices wvas published as THOMAS E. WLLGING, LAURAL L.
& ROBERT J. NIEinc EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL
DisTRIcr COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CWIL RULES (1996)
[hereinafter FJC EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS].
64 NYU EmpiricalAnalysis, supra note 63, at 84.
HOOPER

65

See FJC EMPIRICAL

66

See FJC Rule 11 Study, supra note 54, at 2.

STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS, supra note

63, at 180-85.
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In short, empirical researchers draw from a host of research approaches that can assist rulemakers in determining whether and how
to craft new rules to address identifiable problems. More than one
design and method can be used at a time. Often complementary
methods achieve different purposes. For example, in studying special
masters, the Center was asked to report on the incidence of the use of
special masters and to quantify the frequency with which special masters played various pretrial and post-trial roles. 6 7 In addition to these
quantitative questions, the Committee was interested in knowing
more about the quality of special masters' activities in performing
those roles. 68 For the quantitative aspects of the study, surveying a
nationwide sample of the cases seemed appropriate; for the qualitative
aspects, interviews with judges and lawyers in a targeted subset of the
sample seemed more appropriate. 6 9 The final product weaves together elements of survey and case study methods to present both a
quantitative overview of all cases and a closer qualitative look at selected cases.

70

F.

Commentators' Calls for Research

In contrast to the variety of designs and methods available for
studying the legal system in action, empirically sophisticated commentators appear to have focused on a small subset of available designs
and methods. As noted in the Introduction, one commentator explicitly called for the Advisory Committee to perfect the civil rulemaking
process by adopting a "program of restricted field experiments" that
would enable the Committee "to predict the impact of proposed
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 71 Implementing
true experiments "in a small number of U.S. district courts" would,
according to this commentator, reduce the costs of rulemaking when
67 See FJC SPECIAL MASTERS' STUDY, supra note 44, at 2-3, 15-17.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 13-15.
70 See id. at 2-3, 15-17. Along similar lines, the Center's Rule 11 study combines
a quantitative field study in selected districts with a nationwide survey ofjudges' opinions about the need for, and operation of, Rule 11. FJC Rule 11 Study, supra note 54,
at 2. The RAND study of class actions combines quantitative estimates of the incidence of class actions with case studies and field interviews. See HENSLER ET AL., supra
note 16, at 49-68, 138-39.
71 Walker, supra note 8, at 67. Professor Walker uses the term "restricted" in a
geographical sense to make clear that such experiments need not be conducted on an
unrestricted or national basis. See id. at 75-76. The proposal would not apply to
"amendments intended only to clarify existing Rules." Id. at 76.
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one takes into account "the cost of subjecting persons to rules of dubi'72
ous quality.
Another commentator decried the "ignorance" of the rulemaking bodies, specifically their "studied indifference to empirical questions."73 While less explicit or universal about the research designs to
be employed, this commentator advocated "empirical evidence on the
operation of the Rules or proposed amendments" and put a premium
on knowledge that "concerns alternative reform strategies and their
likely impact."74 In 1995, the Standing Committee's Subcommittee
on Long Range Planning recommended that "[e] ach Advisory Committee should ground its proposals on available data and develop
mechanisms for gathering and evaluating data that are not otherwise
available, and should use these data to decide whether changes in existing rules should be proposed." 75
Amended Rule 11 (the 1983 version) and amended Rule 26(a)
(the 1993 version) were the culprits that led to Professor Burbank's
call for a moratorium on rulemaking. 76 Each of those amendments
dramatically revised national rules and precipitated major changes in
civil litigation. With no equivalent national rules in operation at the
time of the Rule 26 (a) amendment, 77 his call for a study of the impact
of the proposed rule amounts to a call for experimental field research. This is true because the only direct way to study a rule's impact is to put it into effect, either on an experimental basis or across
the board.
In either the Rule 11 or Rule 26(a) contexts, conducting a controlled field experiment of the type described earlier in this Article

72 Id. at 76.
73 Burbank, supra note 6, at 841; see also Thomas E. Baker, An Introductionto Federal CourtRulemaking Procedure,22 Tax. TECH L. REv. 323, 335 (1991) (advocating that
"more should be done to encourage and to utilize empirical work in judicial
rulemaking").
74 Burbank, supra note 6, at 841-42.
75 SELF-STuDY, supra note 12, at 699. The Long Range Plan adopted by the Judicial Conference did not expressly comment on the use of empirical research in the
rulemaking process. The report recommended that "[r]ules should be developed
exclusively in accordance with the time-tested and orderly process established by the
Rules Enabling Act." JUDICIAL

CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE

FEDERAL CouRTs, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 53, 118 (1995).
76 See generally Burbank, supra note 6 (discussing rulemaking in the context of
amendments to Rules 11 and 26(a)).
77 Three federal district courts had on their own initiative adopted local rules
providing for disclosure in civil cases. See Mullenix, supra note 6, at 813-20.
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would be difficult if not impossible. 78 Ideally, studying the impact of
an inchoate proposed rule would require experimental testing of the
proposal in districts that are randomly selected, not self-selected. Developing reliable information concerning the impact of the proposed
sanctions and initial disclosure rules would seem to have depended on
adopting one or both of the rules in one or more districts on an experimental basis. A control group using the standard procedure in
the same districts would have been needed to provide a basis for comparison. To remove the effect of variation among judges, each judge
would have to have been asked to apply both experimental and control procedures to cases selected randomly, without knowing the merits or procedural context.
One could, of course, have surveyed judges and lawyers and have
asked them to predict the impact of the proposed rule on hypothetical future cases, but such responses would necessarily have produced
subjective responses with limited internal and external.validity. In the
context of initial disclosure, studying an analogue of the proposed
rule in a local district or a state court might be the most one could
79
hope for.
Thus, there seems be a disconnect between the calls for empirical
research and the range of designs available to researchers. Commentators have concentrated their efforts at prodding the civil rulemakers
to undertake experimental studies of proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 0 This is not to say that these commentators rigidly adhere to a call for controlled experimental work in
all contexts. Each has also shown an appreciation for empirical research designs that are not experimental 8 l and would undoubtedly
78 See supra text accompanying notes 20-39 (describing a controlled field
experiment).
79 See Mullenix, supra note 6, at 813-20 (discussing three district courts that implemented local rules requiring informal discovery before formal discovery).
80 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & S.Jay Plager, Foreword: The Law of FederalJudicial
Discipline and the Lessons of Social Science, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1993); Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovey Abuse: The Sequel 39 B.C. L. REv. 683
(1998) (relying on nonexperimental empirical research); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reformfor Federal CivilRulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455 (1993) [hereinafter Walker, Comprehensive Reform]; Laurens Walker, Avoiding Surprisefrom Federal Civil
Rule Making: The Role of Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 569 (1994) [hereinafter
Walker, Avoiding Surprise].
81 See, e.g., Burbank & Plager, supra note 80, at 16 (1993) (finding a descriptive
quantitative and qualitative field study to be "the first rigorous study of the experience
under the 1980 Act"); id. at 19 (finding the "number and variety of methods employed were impressive" even though none were experimental); Mullenix, supranote
80, at 683 (1998) (relying on nonexperimental empirical research); Walker, Compre-
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find the use of nonexperimental empirical research approaches to be
an improvement over then-current practices. Nonetheless, at least
one commentator quite explicitly has posited experimental research
designs as the gold standard for rulemakers to employ.8 2 We now
turn to a description of the empirical research that rulemakers have
commissioned and used in the last decade or so.
II.

WHAT TYPES OF EMPRIcAL, RESEARCH HAVE THE CIvIL
RULEMAERS SOUGHT AND USED, AN)

How

OFmN?

The last decade or so has witnessed dramatic changes in the
rulemaking process. The 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling
Act required that Advisory Committee and Standing Committee meetings "shall be open to the public,18 3 after "sufficient notice."8 4 Responding to recommendations from judges and scholars that "rules
changes be predicated on a sounder empirical basis," the advisory
committees increased "their requests for assistance from the Federal
Judicial Center to conduct research on litigation practices and the impact of the rules."8 5 As this Part reveals, the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, in particular, has established a pattern of continuing consultation with the FJC and other empirical researchers about empirihensive Reform, supranote 80, at 476-89 (1993) (calling for rulemaking to obtain adequate information to assess the costs and benefits of proposed rules changes by using
social science methods, apparently not limited to controlled experiments); Walker,
Avoiding Surprise; supra note 80, at 593 (1994) (suggesting as an adequate interim
measure that "economic analysts could furnish an acceptable basis for civil rule making by grounding their generalizations on systematic observations, a standard less demanding than hypothesis testing").
82 Walker, Avoiding Surprise, supranote 80, at 593 (suggesting that "the committee
should either conduct limited field experiments incorporating the proposed changes,
or the committee should wait for change until private research ventures can be
completed").
83 Rules Enabling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4648, (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2073(c) (1) (1994)).
84 Id. § 2073(c) (2).
85 Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. Rxv.
1655, 1680 (1995). Mr. McCabe, Assistant Director forJudges Programs, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and Secretary to the Judicial Conference
Standing Committee, listed five areas in which the Advisory Committee requested FJC
research: a study of Rule 11 before the 1993 amendments, a study on "the use and
operation of protective orders under Rule 26(c), offers of settlement under Rule 68,
consensual settlement of class actions under Rule 23, and the effect of mandatory
disclosure under the 1993 amendments to Rule 26. Id. at 1680-81. He also noted
that the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rtiles "considered the results of the Federal
Judicial Center's study on cameras in the courtroom before approving amendments
to Rule 53." Id. at 1681.

1142

NOTRE

DAME LAW

[VOL. 77:4

REVIEW

cal questions. 86 Such consultations occur before the Committee
proposes rules changes, while it reviews and hears comments on proposals that have been made, and while it deliberates about those proposals. Alongside the increased openness and interest in empirical
findings, some experienced participants in the process expressed concern, perhaps even alarm, that "the openness of the process... may
encourage factional politics." 87 This Part presents research studies;
Part III discusses patterns observed in those research studies and also
considers aspects of the relationship between rulemaking and legislative activity.
Table 1 lists research projects conducted by the Center at the request of the Advisory Committee, including the rule in question, the
type of research conducted, the date of the request, and the date of
the final report. This Part then summarizes the background and purpose of each project and describes links between research findings
and proposed rule changes. Relying primarily on official Committee
notes and published minutes, the discussion concentrates on links between findings and proposals that the rulemakers identified in the
course of their deliberations. Each project is presented in the same
format. Note that a considerable amount of Center research dealing
with procedural matters lies beyond the scope of this Article because
it was not the subject of a request by the Advisory Committee (though
often the subject of a request by another Judicial Conference
committee).88

86

See, e.g., infra notes 89, 101, 119, 149.

87

Carrington, supra note 1, at 165; see also Mullenix, supra note 6, at 830-36.

88

See, e.g., JOE S.

CECIL

& THOMAS E. WILLGING,

FINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER

(1993);

LAURAL

PANELS:

Two

L.

HOOPER, JOE S. CECIL

&

COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS: DE-

FEDERAL

THOMAS

E.

RULE

OF EVIDENCE

706

WILLGING, NEUTRAL SCIENCE

EXAMPLES OF PANELS OF COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS IN THE BREAST IM-

PLANTS PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION (2001); MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & CAROL
KRAFKA, ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF FEDERAL CIL
ENNA ET AL.,

supranote 31;

IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

ADR

PROCEEDINGS

(1994); McK-
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(1996).
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TIMING AND TYPE OF RESEARCH REQUESTED OF THE FEDERAL

JUDICIAL CENTER BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
Federal Civil
Rule Involved
12(b) (6):
Motion To
Dismiss for
Failure To
State a Claim

Date of
Date of
Research Approaches
Request
Report
Observational field study reviewing a random November Spring
sample of terminated 1985 cases in two
1988
1989
district courts and comparison with studies
conducted in 1975 and 1978

Est. Yrs.
0.5

56: Summary Observational field study based on random
1989-1990 1991
Judgment
sample of docket entries and filings in six
(est.)
district courts selected for convenience,
comparing rates and activities with data from
1975 and 1986 studies

1.5

11: Signing
of PleadingSanctions

Observational field study reviewing docketed January
Rule 11 activity in terminated cases in five
1990
district courts selected for convenience

May 1991

1.5

11: Signing
of Pleading
Sanctions

Observational field study surveying all district Spring
judges regarding their experiences with Rule 1990
11 sanctions

May 1991

1.0

11: Signing
of PleadingSanctions

Observational field study surveying a sample Spring
of attorneys and district judges regarding
1995
their experiences with the 1993 amendments
to Rule 11

Summer
1995

0.3

26(c):
Protective
Orders

Observational field study surveying activity
November April &
identified from electronic docket records in 1992
October
three district courts selected for convenience
1994

68: Offer of
Judgment

Quasi-experimental field study surveying
attorneys in four sets of two hundred cases
(contract, tort, civil rights, other), one
hundred of which settled and one hundred
of which went to trial

October
1993

1.5-2.0

April 1994 0.5-1.5
& 1995

47(a):
Observational field study surveying a random Spring
Attorney Voir sample of one hundred and fifty district
1994
Dire
judges; comparison with similar FJC survey
conducted in 1976-1977

October
1994

0.5

23: Class
Actions

Observational field study surveying all
identifiable class actions terminated in a
convenience sample of four districts during
a two year period between 1994 and 1996

Fall 1995

1.5

23(c) (1):
Class Action
Notices

Observational field study of pilot group of
March
nonlawyer FJC employees; four focus groups 2000
composed of persons with high school or
college education

August
2001

1.5

26-37:
Discovery

(1) Observational field study surveying 2000
attorneys in a random national sample of
1000 closed civil cases;
1(2) Literature review of empirical studies

October
1996

September
1997

1.0

53: Special
Masters

(1) Observational field study surveying
docket entries for a 136 case sample
randomly generated from a national
population of approximately 445,000
electronic docket sheets;
(2) Observational field study interviewing
judges and attorneys in a non-randomly
selected subset of the above sample

October
1998

October
1.0-1.5
1999 &
April 2000

April
1994

1144

NOTRE

Federal Civil
Rule Involved
26, 34, and
37:
Electronic
Discovery

23: Class
Actions
(Effects of
Amchem and
Ortiz)

DAME LAW

Date of
Request

Research Approaches
Observational field study surveying
convenience sample of magistrate judges to
identify candidates for approximately twenty
civil case studies of cases with significant
discovery of computer-based evidence; case
studies to include analysis of filed documents
and interviews ofjudges and attorneys
(1) Observational field study surveying
docket sheet activity to determine rate of
class action filings before and after the
Amchem and Ortiz decisions;
(2) Observational field study surveying
attorneys in class actions to determine the
perceived effects of Amchem and Ortiz
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October
1999

Date of
Report

Est. Yrs.

Pending

N/A

December Pending
2001

N/A

Rule 12(b)(6) Study

1. Committee Request
The Advisory Committee requested this study at about the time
commentators began to call attention to the need for empirical work
to support the rulemaking process.8 9 In November 1988, the Committee reviewed and discussed a draft proposal to abrogate Rule
12(b) (6).9o The purpose of the proposed change was to reduce or
eliminate motions that were unproductive in the sense of not contributing to the disposition of the case. 91 One commentator had opined,
tongue-in-cheek, that Rule 12(b) (6) "was last effectively used during
the McKinley administration" and that "it is in a sense a revolving
door device, rarely dispositive. ''9 2 In the reporter's note accompanying the proposed abrogation of Rule 12(b) (6), Professor Carrington
89

See generally Symposium, Empirical Studies of Civil Procedure, Part I, LAw & CONPROBS., Summer 1988, at 1 (reviewing the contemporary condition of the empirical study of civil procedure); Symposium, Empirical Studies of Civil Procedure,PartII,
LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1988, at 1 (reporting on more recent empirical
studies of particular procedural devices, and considering the relation between empirical study and substantive consequences of procedure). For an overview of the articles
in both parts of the symposium, see Paul D. Carrington, Foreword: The Scientific Study of
Legal Institutions, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 1, 1-11; see also Rosenberg, Procedure-ImpactStudies, supra note 3, at 17-29 (emphasizing the importance of
empirical research on the functioning of procedural rules); Walker, supra note 8, at
72-77 (emphasizing the need for a systematic plan for data collection to provide information for guiding the future development of the rules).
90 See THOMAS E. WILLGING, USE OF RULE 12(B)(6) IN Two FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS 1 (1989).
91 Id. at 2.
92 ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
TEMP.

CIL

PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBIL-

rrY 8 (1984).
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suggested that the Committee "consider whether additional data
might be gathered that would illuminate the questions raised by the
proposal."9 3 The Committee in turn asked the FJC to conduct such a

study.
2.

Research Methods

FJC researchers examined docket sheets and case files in approximately three hundred terminated cases in each of two federal district
courts: the District of Maryland and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 94 The courts were selected based in part on convenience 95
and not as representative of all district courts.
3.

Findings and Linkage with Rules Proposals

In those two courts, Rule 12(b) (6) motions led to final disposition of three percent of all cases, a decline from the six percent rate
found in 1975 in those same courts. 96 Though not a large percentage
of the cases, the number of cases was sufficient to persuade the Committee that Rule 12(b) (6) continued to serve a useful purpose. The
Committee considered the Center's data at its April 1989 meeting and
97
decided not to change Rule 12(b) (6).

B.

Rule 56 Summary Judgment Study

1. Background
During the early and mid 1980s, commentators expressed concern that Rule 56, as interpreted, might be inhibiting the utility of
summary judgment because of uncertainty about how Rule 56 should
be applied. 98 Whether the 1986 Supreme Court decisions in a trilogy
WILLGING, supra note 90, at 2.
94 Id. at 7.
95 In addition to their geographical convenience, these two courts had been part
of an earlier FJC study of motions practice. See PAUL R.J. CONNOLLY & PATRICIA A.

93

LOMBARD, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND TE

CIVIL LrrIGAXrvE PROCESS: MOTIONS

4 n.10

(1980). Having baseline data on Rule 12(b) (6) motions enabled the researchers to
compare results within the same two courts over a period of time. SeeWILLGING, supra
note 90, at 5-7.
96 See WILLGING, supra note 90, at 9. The study also found that Rule 12(b) (6)
motions led to the disposition of individual defendants in an additional two percent
of the cases. Id. at 8.

97
98

See id. at 3.
See, e.g., JOE S.

CECIL& C. R. DOUGLAS, SUMMARYJUDGMENT PRACTICE IN THREE
Dismcr COURTS 1 (1987); William W Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal

Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of MaterialFact, reprinted in 99 F.R.D. 465 (1984).
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of cases cured that perceived inhibitory effect was of concern. 99 If
those decisions had not facilitated summary judgment practice, the
case for revising Rule 56 might be strengthened.1 0 0
2.

Committee Request

Around 1989 or 1990, building on an earlier request for data that
predated the 1986 Supreme Court decisions, 10 1 the Committee asked
the Center for data on trends in the filing, disposition, and appeal of
summary judgment motions.
3.

Research Methods

Center researchers examined docket entries and filings in six federal district courts. Three districts were selected because they had
been included in previous studies; the other three districts were chosen because of the perception that they restricted summary judgment
practice.102

4.

Findings and Linkage with Rules Proposals

The principal finding was that the filing of summary judgment
motions in nonprisoner civil cases increased between 1975 and 1986,
but did not exhibit any statistically significant increases between 1986
and 1989.103 Without expressly referring to these findings, the Committee proceeded to publish a proposed rule revision in August
1990.104 As stated in the proposed Committee notes, the purpose of
the proposed changes was
to enhance the utility of the summary judgment procedure as a
means to avoid the time and expense of discovery, preparation for
trial, and trial itself as to matters that ...

can have but one out-

come-while at the same time assuring that parties are not deprived
of a fair opportunity to show that a trial is needed to resolve such
matters. 105
99 CECIL & DouCLAs, supra note 98, at 2-3.
100 See id.
101 The product of that request was the study by Cecil & Douglas. Id.
102 Joe. S. Cecil, Trends in Summary Judgment Practice:A Summary of Findings, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR. DIRECTIONS, Apr. 1991, at 11, 11.
103 See id. at 12-13.
104

See COMM.

ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE

OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFr OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE,

(1990).
105 Id., reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 146.

reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 141
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Aftermath

Proposed changes in Rule 56 were recommended by the Advisory
Committee and forwarded to the Judicial Conference by the Standing
Committee. The Judicial Conference, however, rejected the proposal
at its September 1992 meeting. Judge Keeton, the chair of the Standing Committee reported that
some members of the Conference had argued that the summary
judgment rule was working well in its present form and that judges
had become familiar with the language of the rule and the current
case law. [He also] detected a criticism by some Conference mem10 6
bers that too many changes were being proposed in the rules.
Judge Pointer, the chair of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, added that "some members seemed not to like the case law on
07
Rule 56 and might not have wanted to enshrine it in the rule."'
C. Rule 11 Sanctions Study
1. Background
From the time of its adoption in 1983, revised Rule 11 raised an
intense controversy about the exact nature of the duty imposed by the
amended rule, and whether the rule was being applied in a way that
would chill creative advocacy, have a disproportionate impact on civil
rights litigants, or generate extensive satellite litigation. 0 8 Much of
the controversy appeared to arise from amended Rule l's mandate
that the court faced ith a violation of the rule "shall impose ... an
appropriate sanction."10 9
Motivated by the controversy and by conflicting interpretations of
the operation of Rule 11,110 Center researchers undertook two studies
of Rule 11 before being asked by the Advisory Committee to conduct
additional studies. The first Center-generated study examined the
purposes and standards that federal judges brought to the administration of amended Rule 11. Social psychologist Saul Kassin employed
106 Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
U.S., Meeting Minutes, Dec. 17, 1992, 1992 WL 739926, at *1.
e
107 Id.
108 For an extensive bibliography of the books, monographs, and articles discussing Rule 11, see COMM. ON THE RuLEs OF PRACICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CALL FOR COMMENTS, reprinted in 131 F.R.D. 335,. 350-59
(1990) [hereinafter CALL FOR RuLE 11 COMMENrS].
109 FED. R. C. P. 11.
110 SeeTHOMAS E. WILLGING, THE RuLE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 15 (1989) (stating that "the issues [surrounding Rule 11] have evolved from automatic support or
opposition to the rule to more refined questions about its operation").
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an experimental design in which he presented ten hypothetical scenarios based on ten recently published cases to sitting district judges. I '
Overall, Kassin found "a good deal of interjudge disagreement over
what actions constitute a violation of the rule, only partial compliance
with the desired objective standard," and "a continued neglect of alternative, nonmonetary" sanctions." 2 He also found that a "clear majority of respondents believed that deterrence is the primary purpose
of Rule 11 sanctions" and that 'judges who embrace a compensatory
rationale are the most likely to grant a Rule 11 motion for attorneys'
13
fees."'
The second Center-generated Rule 11 study was a primarily qualitative field study, based on interviews with judges and attorneys regarding Rule 11 sanctions proceedings in which they had been
involved." 4 Among other findings, that study reported that "little evidence was found that [Rule 11] sanctions have a chilling effect on
creative advocacy or unpopular causes";" 5 that "[s]atellite litigation
occurs primarily in cases involving large compensatory sanctions
awards";" 6 that "legitimate complaints from lawyers about surprise
and lack of due process can be accommodated without elaborate satellite evidentiary hearings";" 7 and that "Rule 11 has begun to achieve
its goal of deterring frivolous filings."" 8
2.

Committee Request

In 1990, the Advisory Committee initiated a thorough review of
Rule 11. As one component of its review process, the Committee
asked the Center to conduct an empirical study of the current operation of the rule. The Committee also issued a public call for comments in which it asked, among other things, for information about
the amount of satellite litigation generated by Rule 11, the extent to
which Rule 11 activity has been concentrated in specific types of cases
or on particular types of litigants, and the amount ofjudicial variation
in sanctioning practices." 9
111

SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANcTIONS

112

Id. at xi.

113

Id. atx.

11-15 (1985).

114 See WILLOING, supra note 110, at 17.
115 Id. at 8.
116 Id. at 3.
117 Id. at 7.
118 Id. at 11.

119 See CALL FOR RULE 11
345-50.

COMMENTS,

supra note 108, reprinted in 131 F.R.D. 335,
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Research Methods

The Center conducted an observational field study of Rule 11 activity in five federal district courts by identifying cases with references
to Rule 11 or sanctions in the court's electronic docketing system-a
compilation of all the docket entries for all pending and recently
closed cases. Researchers examined and coded the files in each district, producing five separate snapshot-like descriptions of Rule 11 ac1 20
tivity in those five districts.
The Center also conducted a survey of all district judges about
their experiences and opinions relating to Rule 11. The Center reported to the Advisory Committee the results of both studies in May
1991.
4. Findings and Linkage with Rules Proposals
On June 13, 1991, the new chair of the Advisory Committee, DistrictJudge Sam C. Pointer, Jr., in a memorandum to the chair of the
Standing Committee, indicated that the FJC study, written comments,
public testimony, and various articles and reports lend support to the
propositions, among others, that Rule 11:
(1) "has tended to impact plaintiffs more frequently and severely
than defendants,"
(2) "has too rarely been enforced through non-monetary sanctions," and
(3) has caused litigants and judges'to spend a "not... insignificant
amount of time to deal with Rule 11 motions, the great majority
12
of which were not granted." '
The above findings each have counterparts in specific findings
detailed in the FJC study.' 22 The Committee's findings, in turn, can
be linked with specific amendments. This is not to assert that the
Center's findings are the sole cause or even a primary cause of related
amendments to the rules. The Committee had multiple sources, in
addition to the Committee members' own experiences with and opin120

See FJC Rule 11 Study, supra note 54, at 2.

121 Id. at 4-5 (quoting Letter from the Honorable Sam C. Pointer, Jr. to the Honorable Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee (June 13, 1991) (as revised
after the Standing Committee's July 18-20 meeting)).
122 See id. at 3-4. In addition, the finding on non-monetary sanctions may have
been linked with Saul Kassin's finding that a "clear majority of judge] respondents
believed that deterrence is the primary purpose of rule 11 sanctions," KAssIN, supra
note 111, at x, and that disparities in treatment of the same case may have reflected
differences in judges' "beliefs about the purposes served" by imposing sanctions. Id.

at 29-32.
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ions about Rule 11. In many, if not all, instances, the Center's findings were corroborated by the testimony of witnesses at a public
hearing, by other empirical studies, 12 3 or by other sources.
The Committee's overall findings relating to the 1983 rule's impact on plaintiffs appear to have directly supported the 1993 amendments to Rule 11-specifically the reference in Rule 11(b)(2) to
"claims, defenses, and other legal contentions"' 24 and the listing in
Rule 11(c) (1) (A) of "the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial." 125 Also, the addition of a separate section
(amended Rule 11 (b) (4)) to deal with denials of factual contentions
seems attributable to the finding that Rule 11 sanctions were more
frequently sought against and imposed on plaintiffs.
The Committee's finding regarding non-monetary sanctions led
to amended Rule 11 (c) (2) which imposes a number of constraints on
awarding monetary sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees and costs
to the party seeking sanctions.' 26 Most importantly, Rule 11(c)(2)
clarified that deterrence, not compensation, was the primary purpose
of the rule.
The Committee's finding regarding the time required for satellite
litigation has a direct counterpart in the safe harbor created under
Rule 11(c) (1) for litigants who withdraw contentions after receiving
127
notice of a proposed Rule 11 motion.
123 See, e.g., STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1989) (reporting the findings and recommendations of the task force on the actual implementation of Rule 11); Lawrence C. Marshall, Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans,The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. L. REv. 943, 985-86 (1992) (revealing that re-

search supported by American Judicature Society is substantially similar to that of the
Center).
124 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
125 Id. 11 (c) (1) (A). Before the 1993 amendments, Rule 11 referred in general
terms to "a pleading, motion, or other paper." FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (c) (1) (A), reprinted in
28 U.S.C.A. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 1-11 (West 1992) (Rule
amended 1993).
126 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); see also BURBANK, supra note 123, at 36-45 (discussing
the findings on sanctions).
127 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c) (1) (A). Judge Pointer made that connection in his
testimony to Congress in support of the 1993 amendments to Rule 11: "[W]e believe
the FJC studies amply support our conclusion that there has been an excessive and
unproductive amount of Rule 11 activity. To be sure, the 'safe harbor' will reduce the
risks to a litigant for initially including a questionable claim or defense." Proposed
Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 103d Cong. 9 (1993)
[hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of the Hon. Sam C. Pointer, Jr.).
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In addition to the findings mentioned above, the Center found
that the "majority of those targeted by Rule 11 activity had an opportunity to oppose the imposition of sanctions; however, judges sometimes
128
failed to provide procedural safeguards when acting sua sponte.'
The amended rule addressed that deficiency by adding a requirement
of "notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond" as a precondition
129
to imposing sanctions.
The Center's survey ofjudges led to findings that both supported
and undermined the Committee's proposed amendments. 130 Judge
Pointer did not directly cite findings based on the survey. We summarized the findings in these terms:
Most judges find the rule moderately effective as a deterrent but
have found other case management devices more useful in deterring groundless litigation. In addition, a sizeable minority have
seen some negative impact on the conduct of litigation. Yet a great
majority of judges believe that overall Rule 11 has had a positive
effect on litigation in the federal courts and wish to retain the 1983
language of the rule. 131
The Center's report on the survey cautioned the reader to
"[r] ecall that the judges were surveyed before the Advisory Committee
proposed the new revisions, so this last finding does not reflect the
judges' preference for the 1983 language over the proposed revised
language.' I3 2 In addition, the survey found that "[m]ost judges do
not find groundless litigation to be a problem in counseled cases in
their districts."' 3 3 On the crucial point of whether Rule 11 should
remain mandatory or be made discretionary, survey results provided
ambiguous answers. One could emphasize survey findings that supported the rulemakers' efforts to deal with satellite litigation by loosening the mandatory aspects of Rule 11, or one could emphasize
findings that supported retaining the status quo. The Standing Committee decided to loosen the standard by changing the operative language of Rule 11 (c) from "shall" to "may." The Advisory Committee
34
had proposed retaining the mandatory term "shall."'
128

Hearings,supra note 127, at 3.

129

FED. R. Crv. P. 11(c).

130
131
132
133

See FJC Rule 11 Study, supra note 54, at 28.
Id.
Id.
Id.

134 REPORT ON ISSUES AND CHANGES TO FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FROM
SAM C. POINTER, JR., CHAIRMAN ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RuLEs, TO HONORABLE
ROBERT E. KEETON, CHAIRMAN STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULEs OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

(May 1, 1992), repinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 522-25 (1993).
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In dissenting from the Supreme Court's transmittal of the 1993
amendments to Rule 11 to Congress, Justice Scalia cited the FJC survey as showing that "80% of the districtjudges believe Rule 11 has had
an overall positive effect and should be retained in its present
form." 13 5 In testifying before Congress in support of the proposed

amendments, Judge Pointer referred to Justice Scalia's opposition and
referred to the FJC survey as finding that "the great majority of district
judges believe that Rule 11 .

.

. has been a valuable tool, albeit less

effective than some of the other management techniques available to
136
the courts."'
5.

Outcome and Aftermath

Amended Rule 11 went into effect on December 1, 1993. To reverse some of the amendments to Rule 11, the House of Representatives included provisions to that effect in the Attorney Accountability
Act of 1995, which it passed.' 37 That Act would have made Rule 11
sanctions mandatory, required that sanctions be adequate to compensate injured parties, eliminated the "safe harbor," and made Rule 11
applicable to discovery.' 38 In passing the bill, the House subcommittee responsible for drafting it relied heavily on the same portions of
the FJC survey of judges that Justice Scalia had cited. 3 9 Dissenting
members of the House asserted that "[b] ecause it is of such recent
vintage, the FederalJudicial Center has not had time to study how the
40
revised Rule 11 is working."'
After the House's action in 1995, the Advisory Committee asked
the Center to update its findings on Rule 11 and to "elicit judges'
current views based on their experience with the 1993 amendments.' 4' The Center identified representative samples consisting of
148 federal district judges and 1130 federal trial attorneys. Questionnaires solicited opinions about the major provisions of the Attorney
135 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 507, 509
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136
137

Hearings, supra note 127, at 9.
H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995).

138 See id. § 4. Rule 11 (d) excluded discovery activity from the terms of Rule 11,
leaving discovery sanctions to be governed by the discovery rules, including Rule 37.
FED. R. Clv. P. 11 (d) advisory committee's note.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 135-37; see also H.R. REP. No. 104-62, at
9-10 (1995).
140 H.R. REP. No. 104-62, at 9-10.
141 JOHN SHAPARD, GEORGE CORT, MARIE CoRDIsCo, THOMAS WILLGING, ELIZABETH
WIGGINS & KIM McLAWIN, REPORT OF A SURVEY CONCERNING RULE

OF CIL PROCEDURE

(1995) [hereinafter FJC 1995

11,

RULE 11 SURVEY].

FEDERAL

RULES
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Accountability Act of 1995 as described above. Responses "suggest
that a majority of attorneys and judges generally oppose the [House's]
proposed changes to Rule 11."142 The only exception is that a "major-

ity of judges and defendants' attorneys, and a near majority of plaintiffs' attorneys, believe that the purpose of Rule 11 should encompass
compensation of parties injured by violations of Rule 11 as well as
143
deterrence of such violations."
No changes have been made in Rule 11 since the 1993 amendments, either by the Advisory Committee or by Congress.
D. Rule 26(c) Protective Orders Study
1. Background and Committee Request
In May of 1990, the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative
Practice of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings concerning
the extent to which courts were permitting parties to restrict access to
information obtained through discovery and relevant to public health
and safety by issuing protective orders allowing discovery documents
to be sealed or otherwise kept private. Around the same time, several
bills concerning protective orders and sealed settlement agreements
were introduced in the House of Representatives.'4 FJC staff monitored the hearings and prepared memoranda describing unresolved
145
empirical questions that seemed central to the debate.
In the hearings and in the media, members of Congress and interested groups of citizens raised concerns about the extent to which
federal courts issued protective orders under Rule 26(c) that prevented the public from learning about hazardous substances and
142 Id. at 2.
143 Id.
144 See, e.g., Federal Court Settlements Sunshine Act of 1991, H.R. 3803, 102d
Cong.; Federal Sunshine in Litigation Act of 1990, H.R. 2017, 101st Cong.; Act
Prohibiting Court Orders Which Limit the Availability of Information, H.R. 129, 101st
Cong. (1989); see also FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMrTrEE 102-03 (1990) (advocating the use of protective orders to protect
"sensitive materials"); Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991
U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 459 (arguing that current discovery rules are sufficient to deal
with current problems); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public
Access to the Courts, 105 H.Av. L. REV. 427, 462-63 (1991) (discussing certain reform
proposals dealing with changes in the discovery regime).
145 See, e.g., Memorandum from Elizabeth Wiggins, Joe Cecil, and James Pettier to
William B. Eldridge (Oct. 27, 1992) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Memorandum] (describing the above background and defining the empirical questions).
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products that were the subject of litigation. 14 6 Some also raised concerns about the extent to which the parties accomplished the same
result by stipulating that product-related information would not be
147
disclosed after discovery or settlement.
Developments in Congress, as well as the Center's work and interest in the subject, were communicated to the Chair of the Advisory
Committee. 48 At its November 1992 meeting, the Advisory Committee invited the Center to conduct an empirical study. 149 The Committee noted a caution that even "[i]f a study fails to find widespread
difficulties with protective orders," it will nevertheless be "difficult to
be confident that there are no problems." 5 0 The "first tentative results" of the Center's work were presented to the Committee at its
April 1994 meeting.' 5 ' Center researchers presented an interim re15 2
port to the Committee at its October 1994 meeting.
2.

Research Methods

As in the Rule 11 study, Center researchers identified cases involving protective order activity by examining codes in the court's
electronic docketing system that referred to protective order motions,
stipulations, or orders. 158 They then obtained more detailed information about a random sample of cases that involved protective order
activity from each district by recording information from docket
sheets and case files. 15 4 Tracking the Committee's interests, researchers collected information about the incidence of protective order activity, the use of stipulated agreements compared with contested or
uncontested motions, the number of motions granted and denied,
the stated objectives of protective orders, the frequency with which
146

E.g., Court Secrecy: Examining the Use of Secrecy and Confidentiality of Documents by

Courts in Civil Litigation:HearingBefore the S. Subcomm. on Courts and AdministrativePractice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 124-25 (1990) (statement of Diane
Weaver).
147 E.g., id. at 155 (statement of Paul K. McMasters).
148 See Memorandum, supra note 145, at 4.
149 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S. 5 (Nov.
12-14, 1992).
150 Id.
151 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Comments on Proposed Rules (Apr. 28-29, 1994), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Minutes/cv4-28.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2002).
152 See ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS & MELISSAJ. PECHERSKI, PROTECTrIVE ORDER ACTrvIrv
IN THREE FEDERAL JUDICIAL DisTraCrs: INTERIM REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

ON CIVIL RuLEs 1 (1994) (on file with the author).

153
154

Id.
Id.
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protective orders are modified or dissolved, and the types of cases in
which protective orders are granted. 155
3.

Findings and Linkage with Rules Proposals

In October 1993, the Advisory Committee published for public
comment a preliminary draft of proposed changes to Rule 26(c). 15 6
The thrust of the proposed changes was "to dispel any doubt that a
court has the power to modify or vacate a protective order" and to set
out standards to guide courts in exercising that power.' 57 One theme
that emerged from the Committee discussion of the public comments
was that there was a "continuing paucity of systematic empirical evidence about the use, modification, and effects of protective orders."1 58 At its April 1994 meeting, the Committee deferred its
proposal and expressed to Congress the hope that "a pending Federal
Judicial Center survey of several district courts on the use of protective
orders would provide helpful empirical data on current practices."' 59
At that same meeting, the Committee received "the first tentative results" of the FJC study and noted that it showed "a substantial rate of
protective order activity, more often involving contested motions than
stipulations" and "suggest[ed] the need to examine the common belief that 'most' protective orders result from agreement among the
60
parties."1
The FJC presented its interim report at the Committee's October
1994 meeting. As gleaned from the minutes of the Committee's discussion of that report,' 6 1 the following findings are of interest:
* "there was protective order activity in a range of 4.7% to 10.0%
of all cases" in the three districts studied;
" "[m]ost protective order activity is initiated by motion, not by
stipulation of the parties; the highest figure for initiation by
party stipulation was 26%";
155
156
THE

Id. at 1-2.
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF

U.S.,

PROPOSED

RuLts, reprinted in 150 F.R.D. 323, 383 (1993).

157
158

Id. at 387 (Committee Note).
Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 151.

159

Letter from the Honorable Patrick E. Higginbotham, Committee on Rules of

Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to the Honorable Herb Kohl, U.S. Senate (Aug. 25, 1994) (on file with the author).
160 Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 151.
161 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Rule

26(c) (Oct. 20-21, 1994), available at http://ww.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/cvlO20.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2002).
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"the rate of hearings on motions was highly variable: in the District of Columbia, it was 12%, in Eastern Michigan, 59%, and in
Eastern Pennsylvania, 2%";
o approximately 40% of the motions resolved in the three districts
were granted in whole or in part, and an approximately equal
percentage were denied [while the balance were not ruled on];
o contract, civil rights, and "other statutes" comprised "large portions" of the cases in which "an order was entered to restrict access to discovery materials"; "personal injuries accounted for 8%
or 9% of the total, depending on the district"; and
o protective orders "were modified or dissolved, whether by court
162
order or agreement in very few of the cases."
o

At its October 1994 meeting, the Committee revised its proposed
rule, adding to Rule 26(c) (1) "an express provision recognizing and
confirming the common practice of entering protective orders on
stipulation by the parties."'16 The Standing Committee adopted the
Advisory Committee's recommendation and transmitted it to the Judicial Conference of the United States with a recommendation that it be
sent to the Supreme Court for submission to Congress. After intense
lobbying by public interest groups favoring public access to discovery
materials involving public health and safety, 164 the judicial Conference voted to strike the language in proposed Rule 26(c) (1) that
would have expressly permitted stipulated protective orders. 16 5 The
Judicial Conference then voted to return the matter to the Advisory
Committee for its consideration without any directive as to whether or
not stipulated protective orders should be permitted.1 6 6 The Advisory
Committee recommended, and the Standing Committee approved,
publishing for comment the version returned by the Judicial Confer162 Id.
163 Id.
164 See, e.g., Richard J. Vangelisti, Proposed Amendment to FederalRule of Civil Procedure 26(c) Concerning Protective Orders: A CriticalAnalysis of What It Means and How It
Operates, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 163, 165-66 (1996) ("Under intense pressure from right
of access advocates, the Judicial Conference rejected the proposed amendment."); id.
at 183-84 (further describing the intensity of the lobbying effort, including reference
to front page attention in the New York Times followed by prominent nationwide media coverage); Michael McCauley, ProposedRule Changes Threaten To Increase Court Secrecy, NAT'L B. Ass'N MAc., Feb. 1996, at 31, 36 (describing the proposed changes,
soliciting comments, and offering an "an activist kit about the proposed secrecy
rules"). These interest groups do not appear to have participated in the rulemaking
process prior to this stage.
165 Reporter's Note, Rule 26(c), in Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Agenda Book,
§ III.B (Washington, D.C., Apr. 18-19, 1996) (on file with author).

166

Id.
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ence, including the provision on stipulated protective orders. 167 At its
October 1996 meeting, the Advisory Committee noted the "substantial
controversy" concerning the protective order proposal and held it "for
further study in conjunction with the broader study of discovery issues
68
to be launched over the next year.'
Linkages between the results of the FJC study and the rules proposals remain unclear. After the FJC report, the Committee added a
controversial reference to stipulated protective orders in the proposed
rule. While the Committee expressed surprise that the FJC had found
such a modest percentage of protective orders entered by stipulation,
perhaps the quantification of that activity called the Committee's attention to an aspect of the current practice not covered by the original draft. The Committee change, ironically, appeared to do little
more than authorize a practice that FJC showed to have been used in
a substantial minority of cases involving protective orders.
4.

Outcome and Aftermath

The Advisory Committee conducted an extensive review of discovery rules between 1996 and 1999. The Committee decided not to
include changes to Rule 26(c) in the amendments that went into effect on December 1, 2000. The Committee reasoned that "richly experienced lawyers, from all fields of practice, find no need to change
present protective-order practice."' 69 The Committee acknowledged
that "some members of Congress see a need."' 7 0 Congress has not
adopted any related legislation.
E.

Rule 68 Offers ofJudgment Study

1. Background
Rule 68 permits "a party defending against a claim" to serve an
offer on the adverse party "to allow judgment to be taken against the
defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in
167

COMM. ON RUL.S OF PRAMCE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF

U.S., PROPOSED RULES, reprinted in 163 F.R.D. 91, 140-41 (1995).
168 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Chairman's Remarks (Oct. 17-18, 1996), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/cvlO-1796.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2002).
THE

169 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Rule
26(c) (Mar. 16-17, 1998), available at http://www.uscourts/gov/rules/Minutes/
10348civilminutes.htn (last visited Feb. 12, 2002). The Committee also cited the
FJC's "sophisticated and helpful study." Id. at 39.
170 Id. at 38-39.
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the offer."17 1 If the adverse party does not accept the offer and does
not obtain a judgment "more favorable than the offer, the offeree
must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. '172 By its
terms, the rule is not available to parties making claims. Rule 68, part
of the original 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, appears to have
been rarely used, at least until the 1980s. Around that time, interest
in promoting settlement increased, 173 and proposals to expand the
reach of Rule 68 were introduced as part of the rulemaking process. 174 These proposals would have broadened the scope of Rule 68
by including claimants' offers to settle and by defining "costs" to include attorneys' fees. After considerable debate and criticism, the
75
proposals were shelved.'
2.

Committee Request

In 1992, Judge William W. Schwarzer, then Director of the FJC,
published an article proposing changes in Rule 68. Judge Schwarzer
summarized the "principal objections" to the 1983 and 1984 proposals
as "that fee-shifting offers of judgment could have a devastating im171 FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
172 Id. The Supreme Court has interpreted the term "costs" to include the liability
the defending party might otherwise have to pay the opposing party's attorneys' fees
under some fee-shifting statutes, including the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Awards Act
of 1976, which define the award of fees as part of the "costs" of the action. See Marek
v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
173 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) advisory committee's note (1983 amendment) (discussing then clause 7, now clause 9: "settlement should be facilitated at as early a stage
of the litigation as possible"). See generally D. MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES
FOR FEDERAL DISTRicr JUDGES (1986) (reporting on techniques of civil case resolutions without trial from the perspective of trial judges).
174 In 1983, the Committee published for comment a proposal to amend Rule 68
that would have mandated cost-shifting, including attorneys' fees whenever a plaintiff
or defendant made an offer to settle a claim that was not accepted and that turned
out to be more favorable to the adverse party than the terms of ajudgment obtained
through litigation. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED RULES, reprinted in 98 F.R.D. 353, 361-63 (1983).
In the face of criticism, including challenges to the committee's authority to impose
fee-shifting under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994), the Committee
published for comment a revised rule that it described as "purely procedural" and
that did "not provide for attorneys' fee shifting but authorize [d] imposition of a sanction based on the creation of unnecessary delay and needless increase in the cost of
litigation." COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED RULES, reprinted in 102 F.R.D. 423, 424 (1984).
175 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Neil Vidmar, EmpiricalResearch on Offers of Settlement:
A Preliminary Report, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1998, at 13, 15 and sources
cited therein.
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pact on plaintiffs . . .and that they could circumvent the statutory

provisions for attorney fees in civil fights cases.' 76 The Advisory Committee reviewed Judge Schwarzer's proposal at its November 1992 and
May 1993 meetings and at its October 1993 meeting considered a proposal to adopt "a sanction that provides for limited attorney fee shifting."' 7 7 The proposed mechanism would "shift reasonable post-offer
fees, but subtract the benefit that results from the difference between
offer and judgment and limit the maximum award to the amount of
the judgment"-a proposal that came to be known as the "capped
benefit-of-the-judgment approach."' 7 8 The Committee noted that the
Judicial Conference's Court Administration and Court Management
Committee had endorsed a proposal under a Senate bill that would
I 79
adopt the same provision as a statute.
At the October 1993 meeting, in addition to debating the merits
of the proposed revision to Rule 68 and the intricacies of the Rules
Enabling Act, the Committee debated whether to ask the FJC to study
the merits of the proposal by surveying attorneys in terminated civil
cases. By a vote of seven to two, the Committee defeated a motion
resolving "not ask the Federal Judicial Center to undertake the proposed survey."'u 0 The Committee then voted unanimously to "recommend that the Federal Judicial Center undertake two surveys,
including one focusing on the use of Rule 68 in statutory fee-shifting
cases."'18 1 In the course of its deliberations, the Committee expressly
noted that "the question of allocating responsibility between legislation and the Rules Enabling Act process is difficult" and that there
"may be substantive elements to attorney fee shifting in this setting
82
that counsel action by Congress."'
176 William W Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers ofJudgment-An Approach To Reducing
the Cost of Litigation, 76 JUDIcATuRE 147, 147-48 (1992).
177 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm.,Judicial Conference of the U.S., Rule 68
(Oct. 21-23, 1993), availableathttp://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Mintues/civIO-21.htm
(last visited Feb. 12, 2002).
178 Id. at 15. In other words, in calculating post-offer attorneys' fees the offering
party would have to offset the difference between the offer and the more favorable
judgment. In addition, a plaintiff would only have to pay the opposing party's postoffer attorneys fees up to the amount of any judgment that was less than the unaccepted offer;, a plaintiff would not be at risk of having to pay anything beyond the
amount of thejudgment. If the plaintiff were to receive nojudgment, there would be
no liability for fees.
179 See id. at 14.
180 Id. at 18-19.
181 Id. at 19.
182 Id. at 18.
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Professor Thomas Rowe, an Advisory Committee member from
1994 to 2000, conducted a computer-simulated study of the effects of
different versions of Rule 68 on the negotiating behavior of attorneys
and law students.1 8 3 There was no formal Committee request for his
study.
3.

Research Methods

FJC researchers sent questionnaires to approximately 2000 attorneys from a sample of 800 federal civil cases that had terminated
about one year earlier. Half of the cases had settled and the other
half had been tried.18 4 Approximately 55% of those attorneys responded.1 8 5 Those questionnaires sought the attorneys' opinions
about Rule 68 and their specific recollections and estimates from the
terminated case of the cost of litigation, settlement options, and possible application of variations of Rule 68 proposals. The sample concentrated on the approximately 30% of civil cases in which the parties
were likely to have faced a choice between settlement and trial and
focused on four types of cases: contract, tort, civil rights, and other.
Within those four groups, researchers selected 100 cases that ended in
trial and 100 that ended in settlement. A separate questionnaire was
used for civil rights cases to test the effects of Rule 68 in that type of
case.
In Professor Rowe's study, a simulated civil rights claim arising
out of a mistaken address drug bust provided the framework for attorneys to respond to three alternative versions of Rule 68. Participants
were volunteers who were randomly selected from the roles of the national Inns of Court. One hundred seventy attorneys, approximately
18 6
8.5% of those solicited, participated.
4.

Findings and Linkage with Rules Proposals

A threshold finding goes to the issue of whether the incentives in
Rule 68 to settle cases are worth pursuing. Researchers found sub183

Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & David A. Anderson, One-Way Fee Shifting Statutes and

Offer of Judgment Rules: An Experiment, 36 JURIMETRIcS J. 255, 263 (1996) (discussing
alternative interpretations of Rule 68 in connection with the Civil Rights Attorneys'
Fees Awards Act); see also David A. Anderson & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., EmpiricalEvidence on Settlement Devices: Does Rule 68 EncourageSettlement?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 519,
525-26 (1995) (discussing how proposed changes would impact the likelihood of
settlement).
184 See Si ARD, supra note 35, at 3-5 (describing the research methods).
185 Id. at 5.
186 Rowe & Anderson, supra note 183, at 263.

2002]

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN CIVIL RULEMAKING

1161

stantial opportunities for rulemakers to accomplish much in terms of
reducing the costs of litigation by improving incentives to settle. The
study found that the median expenses of sampled civil cases that went
to trial was $35,000 per party compared to median expenses of
$10,000 per party for sampled civil cases that settled. 18 7 Moreover,
"about 40% of all tried cases could have settled, and 15%-20% very
likely would have settled if the parties simply had engaged in more
negotiation."' 88 As to the timing of settlement, the findings suggested
that "a fee-shifting offer-ofjudgment rule might lead the parties in
about 60% of the cases that would settle anyway to settle more quickly
and might save up to 50% of expenses in half of those cases."' 8 9
Professor Rowe's study of alternative versions of Rule 68 also produced useful threshold information. Rowe and Anderson concluded
that "the interpretation of Rule 68's influence on § 1988 attorneys'
fees can have a significant effect on litigation bargaining."' 9 0 Interpreting "Rule 68 'costs' to include post-offer attorneys' fees normally
paid by plaintiffs under § 1988" would produce the most impact:
"Under this construction, plaintiffs would accept offers 31% below
their no-Rule-68 bottom line, and defendants would make offers 9%
below their no-Rule-68 bottom line."' 9
As to the related question of impact of existing Rule 68 on civil
rights plaintiffs, the FJC study found that "risk aversion is common
among civil rights plaintiffs,"' 9 2 and that "existing Rule 68 may exacerbate the risk aversion of civil rights plaintiffs... [but] only in limited
3
circumstances."19
As to attorneys' opinions about proposals to amend Rule 68, almost three-fourths of the attorneys who responded to the FJC survey
"favored amending Rule 68 to permit offers from both parties and to
include more significant incentives."' 94 Surprisingly, "[e]ven in civil
rights cases, in which Rule 68 is often said to operate entirely to the
benefit of defendants, almost 50% of plaintiffs' attorneys favored retaining the basic approach of the existing rule, while only 27% favored abolishing the current rule."'195 A key finding, however, is that
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

supra note 35, at 6-8.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 12.
Rowe & Anderson, supra note'183, at 273.
Id.
SHAPARD, supra note 35, at 16.
Id at 17.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
SHAPARD,
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"attorneys have strong opinions on both sides of the issue."1 9 6 The
strength of the opposing attorneys' opinions may have contributed to
the decision to abandon the proposals. The Committee also faced
serious uncertainty about the viability of these exceedingly complex
proposals as well as serious concerns about its power under the Rules
19 7
Enabling Act to enact fee-shifting amendments.
5.

Outcome and Aftermath

At its March 20-21, 1997 meeting, the Advisory Committee concluded that "it may prove wise to defer further consideration [of Rule
68 proposals] pending developments in Congress."' 98 Ending a fifteen-year saga on as cheery a note as possible, the Committee's reporter predicted that "Rule 68 may yet provide the occasion for
exploring means of cooperating with Congress in matters that involve
the Civil Rules but that may best be addressed through the exercise of
congressional power to make substantive law."'199 Loosely stated, the
ball is in Congress's court and the Committee's research and debates
are available to assist Congress. None of the congressional proposals
to amend Rule 68, most notably those in the "Contract with America"
20 0
proposals, have been adopted.
F. Rule 47(a) Attorney Participationin Voir Dire Study
1. Background
Rule 47(a) currently provides that "[t]he court may permit the
parties or their attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective
jurors or may itself conduct the examination." 20 1 In the event that the
court conducts the examination, it has the choice of permitting the
parties "to supplement" the court's examination or to "submit to the
196 Id.
197 For a thorough discussion of the questions and concerns the Committee's reporter had about the proposals, see generally Edward H. Cooper, Rule 68, Fee Shifting
and the Rulemaking Process, in REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYsTEM 108-49 (Larry
Kramer ed., 1996).
198 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Mar.
20-21, 1997), available at http://wv.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/cv-97.htm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2002).
199 Id.
200 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Indemnity or Compensation? The Contract with America,
Loser-Pays Attorney Fee Shifling and a One-Way Alternativ 37 WASHBURN L.J. 317, 317
(1998) ("The early weeks of the newly Republican Congress in 1995 may turn out to
have been a high-water mark for the idea of English-style, loser-pays attorney fee shifting in America.").
201 FED. R. Clv. P. 47(a).
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3

prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper."20 2 A 1977 FJC study found that "approximately three-fourths of federal district judges conduct voir dire
examination without oral participation by counsel. 20 3
From time to time, legislation had been introduced in Congress
to establish a right for attorneys to participate in voir dire. At its October 1994 meeting, the Advisory Committee called attention to continuing efforts of senators and representatives to enact such legislation
and to Judicial Conference opposition to such efforts.20 4 Citing the
need for attorneys to develop information to justify the use of peremptory challenges-a need created by the Supreme Court in a series
of cases attempting to control challenges made on the basis of racial,
ethnic, or gender stereotypes 2 5-the Committee drafted proposed
rules that would permit attorney participation in voir dire. 20 6 During
the course of its deliberations, the Committee indicated that without
its action, "the lawyers who have addressed the Committee will return
20 7
to Congress to renew longstanding efforts to secure legislation."
2.

Committee Request

The Committee's chair requested that the Center update its 1977
survey of districtjudges' practices in conducting voir dire. The Committee requested die study early in 1994, and the Center presented its
results at the Committee's October 1994 meeting.

202
203

Id.
GORDON BERmANT, CoNDuCr OF THE Von. DIE EXAMINATION: PRAIICrcS AND

DISTRICt JUDGES 6 (1977).
204 See Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm.,Judicial Conference of the U.S., Rule
47(a) (Oct. 20-21, 1994), available at http://wv.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/cvlO20.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2002).
205 Id. Attorneys argue that cases such as Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
(holding that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for prosecution to exclude jurors based on race), and JE.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (holding
that it was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for a state to use peremptory
strikes to exclude jurors on the basis of gender), spurred the need for greater
participation.
206 See Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Rule
47(a) (Apr. 20, 1995), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/mincv4.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2002).
207 Id.
OPINIONS OF FEDERAL

1 164
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Research Methods

Center staff mailed written questionnaires to a randomly selected
sample of 150 federal district judges, 124 (83%) of whom completed
and returned it.208
4.

Findings and Linkage with Rules Proposals

The 1994 FJC study found that 59% of federal district judges permitted attorneys to participate directly in voir dire proceedings. 2 0 9
The rate of attorney participation had more than doubled since the
1977 FJC study, a change that had occurred without any change in
Rule 47(a). Significantly and surprisingly, the survey also found that
district judges who permitted direct attorney participation in voir dire
spent approximately the same amount of time selecting jurors as
judges who did all of the questioning. 2 10 The study also found a host
of mechanisms that judges use to control voir dire, ranging from general admonitions regarding improper questions to specific limits on
time and manner of attorney questioning. 2 11
The Committee cited all of the above findings during the meeting at which it decided to proceed with a proposal to amend Rule
47(a). 21 2 The Committee's published proposal also cited those findings in the proposed Committee note. 213 The Committee inferred
from the study's findings that 'judges who permit party participation
have found little difficulty in controlling potential misuses of voir
dire" and concluded that "the problems that have been perceived in
some state-court systems of party participation can be avoided by making clear the discretionary power of the district court to control the
behavior of the party or counsel." 21 4 Consistent with those findings,
the Committee draft started with the proposition that "[t]he court
208 Memorandum from John Shapard & MollyJohnson to the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules on Survey Concerning Voir Dire 1 (Sept. 26, 1994) (on file with author
and with the Administrative Office of the U.S. Court's Rules Support Office).
209 Id.
210 Id. at 2. Notably, the median amount of time spent on voir dire increased
from less than one hour in 1977 to between one and two hours in 1994. Id.
211 See id. at 5-6.
212 Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 204.
213 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
reprinted in 163 F.R.D. 139, 145 (1995). The Committee
did present both sides of the participation finding: "Although a recent survey shows
that a majority of district judges permit party participation, the power to exclude is
often exercised." Id., reprinted in 163 F.R.D. 139, 145 (1995) (citing Shapard &Johnson, supra note 207).
214 Id., reprinted in 163 F.R.D. 139, 145 (1995).
THE U.S., PROPOSED RULES,
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shall conduct the voir dire examination of prospective jurors."21 5 The
proposed rule continued by providing that "the court shall also permit
the parties to orally examine the prospective jurors to supplement the
court's examination within reasonable limits of time, manner, and
2 16
subject matter, as the court determines in its discretion."
5.

Outcome and Aftermath

Prior to publication for public comment, the Committee faced an
unprecedented attempt to have the Judicial Conference mandate that
the proposals not be published, an attempt that was rejected by the
Judicial Conference "[aifter spirited discussion."2 17 At the public
hearings, "[a] Imost all of the many federal judges who commented on
the proposal spoke in opposition," voicing as a "common theme ....
the fear that they will lose control if they lose the unlimited right to
deny any lawyer participation in voir dire."218 The Committee decided to shelve the proposed rule change and to encourage the FJC,
"[which] seems receptive-to put voir dire on its educational agenda
for new judges and for judge workshops." 2 19 The Committee noted
that there "may be some room for systematic experimentation to test
220
the information provided by the FJC survey of federal judges.1
Neither the Advisory Committee nor the FJC has taken action on the
latter proposal.
The Committee reported at its October 6, 1997 meeting that the
Committee "did urge the Federal Judicial Center to frame its sessions
for new judges to stress the importance of party participation. This
has been done. Judge Higginbotham, the former chair of this Com2 21
mittee has spoken on the topic at several meetings."

215 Id., reprinted in 163 F.R.D. 139, 144-45 (1995).
216 Id., reprinted in 163 F.R.D. 139, 145 (1995).
217 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Nov.
9-10, 1995), available at http://v.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/min-cvll.htm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2002).
218 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Rule

47(a) (Apr. 18-19, 1996), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/cv41896.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2002).
219

Id. at 5.

220 Id.
221

Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Agenda

Items (Oct. 6-7, 1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/cvlO97.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2002).
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G. Rule 23 Class Actions Study
1. Background
Advisory Committee activity concerning Rule 23 class actions has
followed multiple paths in varying phases over the past decade. For
clarity and simplicity, we present this complex set of proposals within
the framework of these phases, which have roughly followed the tenure of chairs of the Committee.
2.

Phase One

After almost a generation following amendments to Rule 23 in
1966, momentum for change began to build in the late 1980s. 2 22 The
catalyst for Committee action appeared to have been a March 1991
directive from the Judicial Conference that the Committee "study
whether Rule 23, F.R.C.P., should be amended to accommodate the
demands of mass tort litigation." 223 Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr. chaired
the Advisory Committee at that time and had also served on an American Bar Association Section of Litigation committee that had studied
class actions and issued an extensive report in 1986.224 The recommendations included eliminating the three subdivisions of Rule
23(b), treating notice and opt-out provisions of Rule 23(c) on a caseby-case basis, authorizing pre-certification rulings on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, facilitating early judicial management
of class actions, and permitting appellate review of the certification
ruling by permission of the court of appeals. 2 25 The Committee
drafted a proposed rule revision that incorporated many, if not all, of
226
the recommendations contained in that report.

222 For a brief history of the interlude between 1966 and Committee action to
review Rule 23, see FJC EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 63, at 78-81.
223 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 33 (1991). The
Judicial Conference's action in turn originated in a report of the Ad Hoc Committee
on Asbestos Litigation, appointed by the ChiefJustice of the United States in September 1990. AD Hoc COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION, REPORT 37 (1991). The Ad Hoc

Committee's first recommendation was that the Judicial Conference "[ejndorse in
principle the proposition that Congress should enact a national legislative scheme to
come to grips with the impending disaster relating to resolution of asbestos personal
injury disputes." Id. at 27.

224

ABA SEC. OF LITIG., REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITrEE

CLASS ACTION IMPROVEMENTS, reprinted in 110 F.R.D. 195 (1986).
225 Id., reprinted in 110 F.R.D. 195, 199-200 (1986).

ON

226 See Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., 3-5
(Nov. 12-14, 1992). "The current draft is based in large part on a 1986 report of the
Litigation Section of the American Bar Association." Id. at 4.
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Phase Two

In June 1993, the Standing Committee deferred action on the
Committee's proposal, citing the press of other business 2 27 and the
anticipated appointment of new members to the Committee. Judge
Patrick Higginbotham assumed the chair of the Advisory Committee
at its October 1993 meeting and scheduled a series of intensive meetings and symposiums designed to educate the Committee on all aspects of contemporary experience with Rule 23. The Committee
identified and called on selected practitioners, academics, and judges
to recount their experiences with the current rule and to point out
areas that needed attention. Conferences were held at Southern
Methodist University, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of
Alabama, and New York University. The Committee asked the FJC to
conduct empirical research and later encouraged researchers from
RAND to address the subject as well, yielding reports that will be highlighted below. Judge Higginbotham shepherded a series of proposals
through extensive revisions and into publication 228 before his term
expired in 1996.
4.

Phase Three

Judge Paul Niemeyer assumed the Advisory Committee chair in
October 1996 and presided over a period of public comment that
yielded more than 1500 pages of written statements and testimony
and over 7006 pages of transcripts of oral testimony.2 29 This round of
revision produced a single rule change, creating a procedure to petition a court of appeals to allow an interlocutory appeal of a decision
granting or denying class certification.23 0 At Judge Niemeyer's request, the Chief Justice appointed a working group to consider fur227 See discussion supra Parts II.C (Rule 11 Sanctions), II.D (Rule 26(c) Protective
Orders), and II.H.1 (Rule 26(a) (1) Protective Orders).
228 See CoMM. ON THE RuLEs OF PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED RULES, reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 535, 559-66 (1996).

229 The proceedings are compiled into four volumes. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL
RuLEs, JuDitCAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., WORKING PPERaS OF THE ADVISORY COMMrrTEE ON CIVIL RuLEs ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULF 23 (1997) [hereinafter
WORKING PA'ERS]. Volume one covers proposed rules and minutes of committee

meetings as well as appendices reproducing the Center's empirical study and Professor Edward Cooper's article entitled Challenges to the Rulemaking Process. Volume two
contains written comments submitted to the Committee. Volume three contains transcripts of hearings held in Philadelphia, Dallas, and San Francisco. Volume four consists of written statements of witnesses who testified at the hearings.
230 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
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ther actions relating to mass torts, including the possibility of further
23 1
changes in the class action rules.
5.

Phase Four

Judge Niemeyer also began the process of further revisions in
Rule 23 that remain in process. Judge David F. Levi became the Committee chair in 2001. In that year, the Standing Committee published
several proposed changes for comment, 23 2 and the Advisory Committee scheduled hearings in San Francisco, Washington, and Dallas between November 30, 2001 and February 4, 2002.
6.

Phase Five

In June 2001, the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee decided to defer publication of several proposed Rule 23 changes
so that the Advisory Committee could consider them further. 233 The
proposal dealt with overlapping and competing class actions. The Advisory Committee sponsored a conference at the University of Chicago
on October 22-23, 2001 to consider those pending proposals along
with those published for comment.
7.

Committee Requests

There were no requests for empirical study during Phase One.
The Committee chair opted at that time to proceed on the basis of the
Committee's collective experience and the Section of Litigation report. At the outset of Phase Two, however, the Committee expanded
the scope of its review and undertook to develop a research program
on class actions, "working initially with the Federal Judicial Center. '23 4
The Committee's schedule called for interim reports at the University
231 See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES,JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITEE ON CIVIL RULES AND THE WORKING GROUP ON MASS
TORTS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE U.S. AND TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
(1999), reprinted in 187 F.R.D. 293 (1999). The report recommended,
among other things, that the Chief Justice appoint an Ad Hoc Committee on Mass
Torts to recommend legislation, rule changes, and case management approaches.
UNITED STATES

Id., reprintedin 187 F.R.D. 293, 296 (1999). No action was taken on this recommendation, leaving consideration of class action rules changes with the Advisory Committee.

232 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., PROPOSED RULES, reprinted in 201 F.R.D. 560, 586-718 (2001) [hereinafter
2001 PROPOSED RULES].
233 Standing Comm., DRAFT Minutes, June 2001, at 19 (on file with author).
234 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Rule 23
(Apr. 28-29, 1994), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/cv4-28.htm
(last visited Feb. 11, 2002). Judge Higginbotham appointed a research subcommittee
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of Pennsylvania in February 1995, and at New York University in April
1995, with a final report to be prepared in time for the Committee's
deliberations at the University of Alabama in November 1995.
During Phase Four, in March 2000, the Advisory Committee's
subcommittee on class actions asked the FJC to develop illustrative
forms of notice to a class communicating the required information in
plain language. The Center provided interim reports to the subcommittee at its January 2001 meeting and to the Committee at its April
2001 meeting. Notices were posted on the FJC's web site in August
2001 in conjunction with the Committee's publication of proposed
revisions to Rule 23(c).
Phase Five has included informal discussion about potential research projects relating to competing and overlapping class actions
and settlements. In December 2001, the Committee asked the Center
to gather data on class action filing trends and to survey lawyers to
2 35
gather data about the effects of Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor

and Ortiz v. FibreboardCop.236 on class actions in federal courts.
8.

Research Methods

Professor Edward Cooper, the Committee's reporter, developed
an extensive "wish list" of empirical questions to guide the Center's
research effort. 23 7 The topics on the list were: Individual Actions and
Aggregation: Routine Class Actions; Race to File; Representatives:
Who? Whence? Why?; Time of Certification; Certification Disputes;
Plaintiff Classes; Defendant Classes; Issues Classes and Subclasses; Notice; Opt-Outs and Opt-Ins; Individual Member Participation; Settlement; Trial; Small Claims Classes; Fee-Recovery Ratios; Overlapping
Classes; Counterclaims and Discovery; and Res Judicata.
To address this wide-ranging list of issues, the Center staff proposed to study all cases that had terminated within the most recent
two-year period in four district courts that had high levels of activity
and two district courts with medium levels of activity. Major unanticipated difficulties in identifying terminated class action cases in the
consisting of Circuit Judge Anthony Scirica, District Judge David Doty, Professor
Thomas Rowe, and Professor Edward Cooper.
235 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (holding that a class certification failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23).
236 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (holding that "applicants for contested certification"
under Rule 23 need to demonstrate that the class action fund is limited "by more than
the agreement of the parties"); see also infra Part 1LK.
237 An evolved version of Professor Cooper's empirical questions can be found at
Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 13,
42-52 (1996).
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first two districts led to a modification of the proposed study, limiting
it to four districts with high levels of class action activity.2 38 With that

modification, Center reports were presented as scheduled.
Data from a 1987-1990 district court study of judicial time spent
in managing various aspects of different types of civil and criminal
cases were used to identify the amount ofjudicial time various types of
class actions typically took.2 3 9 A case study of class activity in the
2 40
breast implant litigation was proposed for the indefinite future.
9.

Findings and Linkage with Rules Proposals

Rather than review the voluminous findings in the study, this Section will document the findings referred to in the proposed Committee notes to revisions of Rule 23 and in discussions of empirical data
during Committee deliberations. The Committee note to the 1996
proposed revision described in phases two and three, above, stated
generally that the FJC study "provided much useful information that
24 1
has helped shape these amendments."
A key concept in the proposed revision required distinguishing
among claims that could stand on their own, claims that required aggregation to support their viability, and claims where "the probable
relief to individual class members" might not justify "the costs and
burdens of class litigation." 24 2 Informing this approach was the FJC's
finding that "median individual recovery figures ... ranged from $315
to $528 . . . far below the level that would be required to support
24 3
individual litigation."

238 See FJC EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 63, at 197-98.
239 See id. at 22-23, 95-97, 199.
240 This aspect of the proposal led to two Center studies of settlement class actions. See generally GIBSON, supra note 49 (studying mass tort limited fund class action
settlements); TIDMARSH, supra note 52 (investigating five cases in which Rule 23 was
used to obtain settlements of tort class actions). For a full study of the breast implant
litigation, see generally HOOPER ET AL., supra note 88.
241 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
U.S., supra note 228, reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 535, 560 (1996).
242 Id., reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 535, 559 (1996).
243 Id., reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 535, 561 (1996); see also FJC EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
CLASS ACTIONS, supranote 63, at 84-85. At the low end of the scale, Committee dis-

THE

cussions sometimes focused on anecdotes like "an overcharge of 2 cents a month
imposed by a telephone company for 12 months on 2,000,000 customers." Civil Rules
Advisory Comm., supranote 218. The Committee in that instance considered the FJC
data which found nine of 150 certified class actions in which individual recoveries
were valued at less than $100, three of which were valued at less than $25, with the
lowest being $16. "But it was responded that very small claims cases do in fact exist.
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The 1996 proposals included a provision to certify class actions
"for purposes of settlement, even though the requirements of subdivision [23] (b) (3) might not be met for purposes of trial."244 During
deliberations on that proposal, this author specified for the Committee that the FJC study found that "of 150 certified classes, 60 were
24 5
certified only for settlement.
Regarding notice and the opportunity to opt out, the Committee
note reported that "the Federal Judicial Center study suggests that notices of settlement do not always provide the clear and succinct information that must be provided to support meaningful decisions
whether to object to the settlement or.. . whether to request exclu247 the Committee states that
sion."246 In the 2001 proposed revision,
the notice to the class "must concisely and clearly describe in plain,
easily understood language" the relevant rights and consequences that
flow from class certification. 248 In conjunction with the publication of
that proposed revision, the Center has published on its web page illustrative securities and product liability notices written in plain
2 49
language.
Regarding the timing of the class certification decision, both the
1996 and 2001 proposals contain language designed to alter the "as
soon as practicable" provision in the current rule. Both versions cite
the FJC study's uncovering of "many cases in which it was doubtful
whether determination of the class-action question was made as soon
At least in some parts of the country very small claims classes are filed in state courts
and removed." Id.
244 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., supra note 228, reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 535, 559 (1996).
245 Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 197. In Amchem v. Ortiz, 521 U.S. 591
(1997), the Supreme Court concluded that settlement is relevant to class certification
after citing the FJC study for the proposition that "the 'settlement only' class has become a stock device." 521 U.S. at 618; see also FJC EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS,
supra note 63, at 146 ("A large number of these cases were settlement classes which
were certified simultaneously with the preliminary approval of a proposed
settlement.").
246 CoMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., supranote 228, reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 535, 564 (1996); see also FJC EMPIRImCAL
STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 63, at 132-34.
247 See supra Part II.G.5.
248 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., PROPOSED RULES, repfinted in 201 F.R.D. 586, 604-05 (2001). The Committee note references the FJC study. Id., reprinted in 201 F.R.D. 586, 607-08 (2001).
249 Judge David Levi's memorandum transmitting the proposed revisions refers
the reader to the FJC's illustrative notices. Id., reprintedin 201 F.R.D. 586, 594 (2001).
The illustrative notices can be found at http://www.c.gov under Current FJC Activities: Class Action Notices (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
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as practicable after commencement of the action." 250 The FJC study
found that overall "approximately two out of three cases in each of the
four districts had rulings on either a motion to dismiss, a motion for
summary judgment, or a sua sponte dismissal order" before any ruling
on class certification. 251 The proposed Committee note indicates that
"[t]he party opposing the class may prefer to win dismissal or summary judgment as to the individual plaintiffs without certification and
without binding the class that might have been certified." 252 To conform with the practice found in the FJC study, a practice the Committee deemed to be valuable, the Committee proposed the substitution
25 3
of "at an early practicable time" for "as soon as practicable."
The FJC study found a handful of cases in which there was no
notice and hearing before the court approved a classwide settlement.254 Without referring directly to the FJC findings, the proposed

1996 revision added a hearing requirement to Rule 23(e) "to confirm
the common practice of holding hearings as a part of the process of
255
approving dismissal or compromise of a class action."
In proposing a discretionary interlocutory appeal as new Rule
23(f), the Committee cautioned that "[p]ermission to appeal should
be granted with restraint" because "[tihe Federal Judicial Center
study supports the view that many suits with class-action allegations
present familiar and almost routine issues that are no more worthy of
immediate appeal than many other interlocutory rulings. ' 256
In Phase Four, the Committee proposed a new set of rules dealing with appointment of counsel and awarding attorneys' fees. In the
Committee note to proposed Rule 23(g), the Committee referred to
the FJC study's finding on the time between the filing of the action
and rulings on certification to support the proposition that setting
250 2001 PROPOSED RULES, supra note 232, reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 560, 607-08
(2001); see id., reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 560, 564-65 (2001).
251 FJC EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 63, at 32.
252 2001 PROPOSED RULES, supra note 232, reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 560, 608 (2001).
253 Id., reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 560, 604 (2001). The Committee note discusses at
considerable length reasons judges may have for deferring the decision on class certification. Id. at 607-10.
254 FJC EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 63, at 146-47.
255 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE
U.S., PROPOSED RULES, reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 523, 565 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 PROPOSED RULES].
The 2001 proposals contain a hearing requirement in Rule
23(e) (1) (C), which "confirms and mandates the already common practice of holding
hearings as part of the process." 2001 PROPOSED RULES, supra note 232, reprinted in
167 F.R.D. 560, 619 (2001).
256 FED. R. Cry. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note; see also NYU EmpiricalAnalysis,
supa note 63, at 87-92.
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aside time for appointing counsel "should not often present
difficulties."

257

In proposing a new rule regarding procedures and standards for
awarding attorneys' fees, Rule 23(h), the Committee cites the RAND
report for the proposition that "[f] ee awards are a powerful influence
'258
on the way attorneys initiate, develop, and conclude class actions.
The Committee also cited the same report for the proposition that a
"fundamental focus is the result actually achieved for class
259
members."
10.

Aftermath

Of the 1996 proposals, the interlocutory appeal provision of Rule
23(f) was the only change adopted. It went into effect on December
1, 1998. Proposals relating to factors affecting the certification of class
actions, including settlement class actions, have been deferred but not
discarded. In December 2001, the Committee asked the Center to
conduct research relating to the need to revive proposals to clarify the
criteria for certifying settlement class actions. Proposals published for
comment in August 2001 are pending hearing and further review by
the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee. They include
the proposals discussed above dealing with the timing of certification,
the clarity of notice, the review of settlements, the appointment of
class counsel, and the award of fees. None of these appear to be controversial. The Phase Five proposals remain under Committee
consideration.
H.

Rules 26 to 37 Discovery Study

1. Background
In December 1993, what one commentator described as "perhaps
the most contested discovery changes in the history of the Federal
Rules" took effect. 260 Most of the controversy centered on the disclosure rules. 26 ' Because Congress had adopted the CivilJustice Reform

Act of 1990, which called for a five-year period of exploratory use of
257 2001 PROPOSED RuLEs, supranote 232, repinted in 167 F.R.D. 560, 640 (2001).
258 Id., reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 560, 646 (2001).
259 Id., reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 560, 650 (2001).
260 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of
Scope 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 549 (2001).
261 See id. The amendments barely escaped congressional rejection. See Richard
L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 767-68 (1998) and
sources cited therein. For a summary of related discovery rules changes proposed
and adopted in 1993, see id. at 764-68.
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various cost and delay reduction approaches as adopted by local district courts, the Committee had good reason not to propose making
the 1993 Rule 26(a) (1) disclosure rules mandatory across all districts.

262

Instead, the 1993 Rule permitted courts, by local rule, to ex-

empt all or particular types of cases from disclosure requirements or
to modify the information to be disclosed.2 63 The result was what
came to be referred to generally as a "balkanization" of federal discov264
ery practice.
In 1996, the American College of Trial Lawyers recommended to
the Committee a proposal to limit the scope of discovery to matters
relevant to the claims and defenses in a case. 2 65 Rule 26(b) (1) at that

time permitted discovery into all matters relevant to the "subject mat26 6
ter" of the litigation.
2.

Committee Request

At his first meeting as Chair of the Advisory Committee in October 1996, Judge Paul V. Niemeyer gave priority to the issue of discovery revision. He announced that "[t]he time may have come to
consider changes [in discovery rules] more fundamental than those
made in recent years." 267 Judge Niemeyer appointed a discovery subcommittee, 266 outlined a possible three-layered approach to discovery,
including the American College of Trial Lawyer's proposal, 269 laid out
a plan for gathering information and convening a conference the following September, 2 70 and discussed with FJC staff the type of research
the Center might be able to provide. 271 The FJC research results
would be presented at the September 1997 conference proposed by
Judge Niemeyer.
262 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee's note.
263 See id.
264 See generally Marcus, supra note 261, at 770-72.
265 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., New
Business (Apr. 18-19, 1996), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
CV4-1896.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
266 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1) (amended 2000).
267 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Chairman's Remarks (Oct. 17-18, 1996), available at http://iw.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CV10-1796.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
268 Id.
269 See Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Discovery (Oct. 17-18, 1996), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
CV10-1796.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
270 See id.
271 See id.
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Research Methods

The Center's approach to research oft discovery was two-pronged.
To capture the rich history of empirical work on discovery, Center
researchers reviewed the empirical literature on the subject.2 72 To
document current activity, the*Center, working with the discovery subcommittee then chaired by District Judge David F. Levi, proposed to
survey attorneys in 1000 recently terminated federal cases, seeking information about the amount and cost of discovery in those cases, the
type and costs of any problems faced during various discovery events,
and the perceived effects of initial disclosure, expert disclosure, and
other aspects of the 1993 amendments. In addition, the Center and
the subcommittee decided that the questionnaire should solicit the
attorneys' opinions about the need for discovery reform and the most
273
promising approaches to any needed reforms.
4. Findings and Linkage with Rules Proposals
As with the class action findings, the results of the discovery research are too detailed to be included here. In general, the survey
found that attorneys reported:
" discovery expenses were typically quite modest, representing
274
about 3% of the amount at stake in the litigation;
* discovery occurred in 85% of the cases studied and discovery
problems occurred in almost half of those cases; expenses associated with such problems represented about 4% of overall litiga275
tion expenses;
* high levels of discovery problems and expenses were associated
with high stakes, complex, contentious, or discovery-laden litigation (but did not occur in all such cases);276
" initial disclosure was being widely used and in cases in which it
had any effect, the process worked as intended to reduce ex272 The product of that review was published as part of the September 1997 Boston College Symposium Conference on Discovery Rules. See McKenna & Wiggins,

supra note 60, at 787-807.
273

The product

of the survey research was initially published by the Center as

THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND
PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE:
IN CLOSED

PROBLEMS,

A

DISCLOSURE PRACTICE,

CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL

CIVIL CASES (1997) thereinafter FJC DIsCOVERY PRACTICE,
PROPOSALS], and a later version was included in the 1JC Disclosure &

FEDERAL
AND

Discovery Study, supra note 54.

274 FJC DISCOVERY PRACTICE, PROBLEMS & PROPOSALS, supra note 273, at 4.
275 Id. at 2-5.
276 Id. at 4.
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pense and delay without interfering with fair resolution of
cases; 277 and
the majority of attorneys wanted a uniform national rule gov278
erning disclosure.
a.

Initial Disclosure

For district judges, the proposal to remove the right of local districts to opt out of the requirements of Rule 26(a) (1) represented the
most controversial aspect of the proposed changes. In the debate
over whether to repeal, modify, or extend the then-current rule to the
national level, the Advisory Committee considered several alternatives.
The first was the version of Rule 26(a) (1) that had been adopted in
1993, which required disclosure of witnesses or documents that were
"relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings."2 79 The Committee noted that "initial studies.., find [the 1993
amendments] effective. The FederalJudicial Center study is the most
recent and detailed." 28 0 More specifically, Committee members observed that the FJC study showed that "initial disclosure . . . rather
often succeeds in reducing cost or delay, or promoting settlement, or
28 1
leading to better outcomes."
Despite the FJC findings on the effectiveness of the 1993 amendments, the Committee responded to concerns expressed by judges
and attorneys in districts that had opted out of the 1993 amendments.
In the interests of uniformity and avoiding a battle among judges, lawyers, and members of Congress like the one that accompanied the
1993 amendments, 28 2 the Committee adopted a "middle-ground proposal" that was expressly designed to "eliminate the 'heartburn' that
arises from requiring disclosure of the identity of unfavorable witnesses and documents." 28 3 Thus, the Committee adopted a version
that limited the required disclosures to witnesses and documents that
28 4
the disclosing party "may use to support its claims or defenses."
277
278
279

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) (A), (B), reprinted in FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND RULES 132 (West 1999) (Rule amended 2000).
280 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Disclosure (Mar. 16-17, 1998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
0398civilminutes.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
281 Id.; see also FJCDisclosure & Discovery Study, supra note 54, at 562-65 (discussing

the perceptions of initial disclosure's effects).
282 See supra notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
283

Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 280.

284

FED.

R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) (A) & (B).
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At the meeting in which the discovery proposals were approved in
their final form,Judge Levi, then chair of the discovery subcommittee,
noted that he had been "surprised by the support expressed for initial
disclosure" 285 and "learned that disclosure is practiced more widely
than we had thought."286 He argued for "a uniform national procedure to enforce national substantive law." 28 7 Judge Levi observed that

the Committee had "heard opposition from many judges, but they
have not had the information we have had ....When empirical work
can be done, we have had it done." 288 In the end, the Committee
accepted the compromise "middle-ground" version, arid it went into
289
effect on December 1, 2000 with little apparent fanfare.
FJC data from the survey of attorneys and from other sources sup2 90
ported the Committee's decision to seek a uniform national rule.

The Committee cited prior FJC data to support the empirical proposition that "[a] striking array of local regimes in fact emerged for disclosure and related features introduced in 1993."291 The Committee
observed specifically that "[1] awyers surveyed by the Federal Judicial
Center ranked adoption of a uniform national disclosure rule second
among proposed rules changes (behind increased availability of
judges to resolve discovery disputes) as a means to reduce litigation
292
expenses without interfering with fair outcomes."
The Center provided a less controversial form of assistance to the
Committee in helping to determine which broad categories of cases
should be excluded from the Rule 26(a) (1) disclosure requirements. 29 3 These "low-end exclusions" represented the types of cases
in which discovery was unlikely. By surveying local rules promulgated
285 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm.,Judicial Conference of the U.S., Motion:
Rule 26(b) (1) (Apr. 19-20, 1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/0499civilminutes.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2002).
286 Id.; see also FJCDisclosure & Discovery Study, supranote 54, at 559-61 (discussing
the prevalence of initial disclosure activity).
287 Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 285.
288 Id.
289 An archive of rules submitted for Supreme Court approval can be found at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/archive.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2002).
290 FJC Disclosure &Discovery Study, supra note 54, at 588-91.
291 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (2000 amendment) (discussing
purposes of amendments) (citing D. STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPLEMENTATION
OF DISCLOSURE IN UNITED STATES DismaCr COURTS, WITH SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO
COURTS' RESPONSES TO SELECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RuLE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

26 (1998)).
292 Id. (citing FJC DISCOVERY PRACTICE, PROBLEMS,AND PROPOSALS, supra note 273,
at 44-45).
293 For a listing of the categories excluded, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) (E).
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under Rule 16 and under the 1993 disclosure rules and listing all exclusions, the FJC gave the Committee's reporter systematically-collected information about district courts' practices in excluding cases.
Using case filing statistics, the Center was able to estimate the percentage of all civil cases-approximately 33%-likely to be affected by the
294
exclusions.
b.

Scope of Discovery

For members of the bar, the most controversial and contentious
aspect

295

of the Advisory Committee's proposals to revise the discovery

rules involved narrowing the scope of discovery from matters "relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action

'29 6

to matters

"relevant to the claim or defense of any party,"29 7 subject to expansion
by court order to allow discovery of any matter relevant to the subject
matter. 298 The Committee supported its position, in part, by referring
to the FJC study's finding that "[n] early one-third of the lawyers surveyed in 1997 by the Federal Judicial Center endorsed narrowing the
scope of discovery as a means of reducing litigation expense without
interfering with fair case resolutions." 299 Of course, as Professor
Thomas Rowe, a member of the Committee, observed in citing the
same data, "'two-thirds [of the attorneys surveyed] did not express this
view.' "300 Moreover, the lawyers surveyed by the FJC ranked narrowing the scope of discovery fifth out of six types of reforms presented
for their consideration.3 0 1 Had the proposed rule been in effect at
the time of 'the survey, attorneys estimated that it would have reduced
litigation expenses by about 12%.302
294 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (2000 amendment) (subdivision (a) (1)) (referring to the FJC estimate that the exemptions amount to about onethird of all civil filings).
295 See supra notes 260-65 and sources cited therein.
296 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1), reprinted in FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND
RULES 133 (West 1999) (Rule amended 2000).
297 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
298 Id.
299 FED. R. Crv. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (2000 amendments) (subdivision
(b) (1)); see also FJC Disclosure &?Discovery Study, supra note 54, at 584-87 (discussing
changes likely to reduce discovery problems and expenses).
300 Stempel, supra note 260, at 578; see also infra note 325 and sources cited
therein.
301 FJC Disclosure and Discovery, supra note 54, at 586-87.
302 Id. at 584-85 tbl.35.
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Duration of Depositions

The Committee amended Rule 30(b) (2) to limit depositions to
"one day of seven hours"30 3 unless the parties stipulated or the court
ordered otherwise.3 0 4 The FJC study found that the typical deposition
in the surveyed cases took three hours and that three-quarters of the
cases had depositions that averaged five hours or less. 3 0 5 In response
to a discovery subcommittee request, the FJC examined its survey
database further and found that for those relatively few attorneys
(sixty-nine of 572, or 12%) who reported that depositions lasted too
long, the median length of the deposition was seven hours.3 0 6 Ten
percent of the overlong depositions lasted twenty-four hours or
more.30 7 Also, in response to a subcommittee request made during
the course of its drafting, FJC staff examined local district court rules
limiting the length of depositions and found that the length of depositions in those districts did not differ from those in districts without
such local rules.30 8 The Committee adopted the limit of seven hours,
a number tailored to fit below a level that some attorneys had found
problematic.
d.

Number of Depositions

The Advisory Committee considered but decided against lowering the presumptive number of depositions below the ten per side
permitted by Rule 30(a) (2) (A). The Committee noted that the "FJC
study shows that most cases involve far fewer depositions than
[ten]."309 In deciding not to lower the limit, the Committee observed
3 10
that it had no indication that ten depositions per side is too many.
303
304
305
306
(Dec.
307
308

FFD. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2).
Id.
FJC Disclosure & Discovery Study, supra note 54, at 57'1.
Memorandum from Thomas E. Willging to the Discovery Subcommittee 3
22, 1997) (on file with author).
Id.
MARIE CoRDIsco LEuR & THOMAS E. WILLGING, NuMERicAL AND DURATIONAL

Lirrs ON DISCOVERY EVENTS AS ADOPTED IN FEDERAL LOCAL RuLEs AND STATE PRAC.

rICES 10-11 (1998) (on file with author).
309 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm.,Judicial Conference of the U.S., Number
of Depositions (Mar. 16-17, 1998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Min-

utes/0398civilminutes.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2002); see also JC Disclosure & Discovery
Study, supra note 54, at 571 (Table 24 shows that 75% of cases had seven or fewer
depositions).
310 See Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supranote 309; see also FJC Disclosure &Discovery Study, supra note 54, at 573 (Table 25 indicates that 4% of attorneys reported there
were too many depositions in surveyed cases).
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The Committee also commented that the "fact that most cases are
completed with far fewer [than ten] depositions tends to support the
conclusion that the stated limit has not encouraged parties to take
311
more depositions than they otherwise would."
e.

Discovery Cutoffs

In its study of courts participating in the evaluation of the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 policies, RAND found that reported lawyer
work hours on a case were significantly lower and the time to disposition of a case was significantly shorter in districts with smaller median
numbers of days to the discovery cutoff.3

12

RAND asserted that these

findings supported the policy of adopting shorter discovery cutoffs to
reduce costs and delay.3 13 In its survey, the FJC was unable to replicate those findings despite using case-specific measures of discovery
314
cutoffs and case duration.
The Committee considered and decided not to adopt any of several alternatives for setting a date after which discovery would be cut
off. The Committee made reference to RAND and FJC data during its
deliberations, but its decision seemed to hinge primarily on the difficulty of setting firm trial dates to accompany any discovery cutoff and
the belief that an early discovery cutoff made little sense without an
3 15
early firm trial date.
I. Rule 53 Use of Special Masters Study
1. Background
Rule 53 authorizes courts to appoint special masters in exceptional cases. The framework of the rule "appears to contemplate the
traditional activity of a special master in holding evidentiary hearings
and issuing reports with factual findings to facilitate a trial."316 Although no empirical data existed until recently, it was apparent to
sophisticated observers that the functions for which courts appointed
special masters had grown far beyond the limited reach of Rule 53.317
311
312
313
314

Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 309, at 37.
See Kakalik et al., supra note 16, at 666-67.
See id. at 680-81.
See FJCDisclosure & Discovery Study, supra note 54, at 557-59.

315 See Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Discovery Time Cut-off (Mar. 16-17, 1998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Minutes/0398civilminutes.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2002)..
316 FJC SPECIAL MASTERS' STUDY, supra note 44, at 1.
317 See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 53: An EnablingAct Challenge, 76 TEX. L.
REv. 1607 (1998).
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At the suggestion of two local district court Civil Justice Advisory
Groups in 1993, the Advisory Committee began to consider revising
the rules to accommodate various uses of special masters. 318 The
Committee debated various approaches, including possible amendments to Rules 16 or 53, over a span of four meetings before deciding
3 19
that there was "no apparent need for imminent action.1
2.

Committee Request

At its December 1998 meeting, Judge Niemeyer appointed a subcommittee to "make a recommendation whether Rule 53 reform
should be pursued." 320 The Committee noted the need to "form a
clear picture of the seeming wide variety of present practices," 3 21 and
Judge Niemeyer indicated that it would be "appropriate to ask the
Federal Judicial Center to undertake any study that can be designed
in consultation with the Subcommittee." 3 22 The Center and the subcommittee designed a research plan that would produce preliminary
data on the incidence of special master activities for the October 1999
meeting and a final report for the April 2000 meeting.
3.

3 23
Research Methods

This study was based on cases in which special master appointments were considered. For the first phase of the study, a sample of
136 cases in which special master activity was recorded on a docket
sheet was extracted from a population that included approximately
445,000 terminated civil cases. Incidence of appointment was estimated based on this sample. Information from case files in the sample of cases was collected to respond to questions relating to the
circumstances of the appointment, the nature of the special masters'
duties, the type of person appointed, and other issues related to the
operation of Rule 53.
In Phase Two, researchers conducted telephone interviews of
judges and attorneys in a portion of the sample of cases. These interviews were designed to address qualitative questions regarding how
318 Id. at 1608 n.6.
319 Id. at 1609.
320 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Copyright Rules: Related Rules 65, 81 (Nov. 12-13, 1998), available at http:/
Nww.courts.gov/rules/Minutes/I198civilminutes.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).

321
322
323
note

Id.
Id.
For a discussion of the methods used, see FJC SPECIAL MASTERS'
44 at 13-15, 81-92.

STUDY,

supra
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the rule worked in practice, the goals of the appointment, their effectiveness, problems encountered, and the need, if any, for a rule
324
change.
4. Findings and Linkage with Rules Proposals
The threshold question before the Committee was whether to
proceed with revising Rule 53. Though appointing a special master
was rarely raised, occurring in less than three cases per 1000, the raw
number of cases, more than 600 cases per year, impressed the Committee as "not a rare or inconsequential event."325 Moreover, the
"wide range of activities from pretrial through trial and on to post-trial
work... suggests there is at least room to expand Rule 53, which
focuses only on trial uses." 326 The Committee concluded that the FJC

data "suggest a need to update Rule 53 to cover pretrial and post-trial
activity"3 27 and decided to proceed with revising Rule 53 "while the
3 28
FJC goes on with [Phase 2 of] its study."
The Committee drafted a revised rule that clarified the authority
ofjudges to appoint pretrial and posttrial masters, citing the FJC study
as confirming the premise for the revision.3 2 9 In the Committee note,
the drafters start with the proposition that "Rule 53 is revised to reflect
changing practices in using masters" 330 that "[a] study by the Federal
Judicial Center documents the variety of responsibilities that have
'3 3 1
come to be assigned to masters."
The Center report addressed the question of how appointments
at the pretrial and post-trial stages came to pass under a rule that did
not provide for them. The answer was that "[c] onsent and acquies324 For a listing of the research questions, see id. at 12-13.
325 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Rule 53
Subcommittee 37 (Oct. 14-15, 1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Minutes/1099mnCV.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2002); see also FJC SPECIAL MASTERS'
STUDY, supra note 44, at 3, 15-21 (discussing the incidence of the special master
appointment).
326 Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 325, at 37; see also FJC SPECIAL MASTERS' STUDY, supra note 44, at 4-5, 52-64 (discussing why special master rules are
working despite their limits).
327 Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 325, at 38.
328 Id.
329 2001 PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 232, reprinted in 201 F.R.D. 560, 670 (2001)
(stating that "[t] he Federal Judicial Center did a study that... confirmed that special
masters often are used for purposes not clearly contemplated by Rule 53").
330 Id., reprinted in 201 F.R.D. 560, 693 (2001).
331 Id., reprinted in 201 F.R.D. 560, 694 (2001) (citing FJC SPECIAL MASTRaS' STUDY,
supra note 44).
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3

The proposed Rule

53(a) (1) would*provide that "a court may appoint a master... (A)
33 3
[to] perform duties consented to by the parties.1
The proposed revision calls for the order appointing a special
master to specify "the circumstances, if any, in which the master may
communicate ex parte with the court or a party."334 In presenting the
proposal to the Standing Committee, the Advisory Committee's reporter "pointed out that the FederalJudicial Center's study of masters
in the district courts had revealed that ex parte communication between a master and either the court or the parties are the focus of
continuing concern but may be very beneficial in certain circumstances."3 3 5 He went on to say that ex parte communication was "the
single most difficult problem cited by interviewees" in the FJC
36
study.3
Despite the lack of empirical data, the Committee proposed a major change in special master practice, namely the removal of authority
to appoint a special master to review facts and present a report in a
jury trial. Center research found, somewhat ironically, that special
masters were infrequently appointed for trial purposes, the original
core purpose of Rule 53 appointments.3 37 In none of the cases studied intensively in Phase Two did the appointments contemplate testimony before a jury by a special master.33 8 Seven cases were studied,
four of which involved bench trials and the other three of which involved court-appointed experts under Federal Rule of Evidence
706.339 The Committee's rationale, however, deemphasized any empirical issues. The Committee concluded that the "practice intrudes
on the jury's province with too little offsetting benefit" and that the
trial master's evidence taking would be insulated from the jury and
3 40
perhaps even from a reviewing court.
FJC SPECIAL MASERS' STUDY, supra note 44, at 5.
333 2001 PROPOSED RULES, supra note 232, reprintedin 201 F.R.D. 560, 683 (2001).
The proposed Committee note addresses the question of acquiescence by urging
courts to "be careful to avoid any appearance of influence that may lead a party to
consent to an appointment that would otherwise be resisted." Id., reprinted in 201
F.R.D. 560, 695 (2001).
334 Id., reprinted in 201 F.R.D. 560, 686 (2001).
335 Standing Comm., supra note 233, at 27.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 See FJC SPECIAL MAsTmRs' STUDY,supra note 44, at 24-25.
339 Id.
340 2001 PROPOSED RULES, supra note 232, reprinted in 201 F.R.D. 560, 696-98
(2001).

332
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Aftermath

The proposed rule is pending. Written comments were due by
February 15, 2002. No one commented on Rule 53 at the first hearing, which was held in San Francisco on November 30, 2001. Apparently, the proposed rule has not generated any controversy. The
Advisory Committee was expected to review the proposed rule at its
May 2002 meeting. If approved by the Advisory Committee, the
Standing Committee, and the Judicial Conference at their 2002 meetings, and if approved by the Supreme Court and transmitted to Congress by May 1, 2003, the proposed amendment would go into effect
34 1
on December 1, 2003, unless Congress intervenes.
J. Rules 26, 34, and 37 Electronic Discovery Study
1. Background
In October 1999, the Discovery Subcommittee of the Advisory
Committee identified "electronic discovery"-that is, the discovery of
computer-based evidence such as e-mail, databases, and Internet activity-as an area of growing concern for practitioners and judges
alike.342 Several proposals had been floated in the legal literature to

refine the definition of "document" found in Rule 34 or to specifically
address problems associated with electronic discovery in Rule 26.
During 2000, the subcommittee held two "mini-conferences" with
practitioners, judges, and technical experts to explore the problems
further and determine whether amendment of the rules was either
343
necessary or desirable.
2.

Committee Request

There being no consensus on the subcommittee or from the
mini-conferences as to whether amendment of the rules was necessary, the subcommittee asked the FJC to conduct case studies to determine whether existing discovery rules helped, hindered, or had no
341 See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994).
342 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Discovery 23-28 (Oct. 14-15, 1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
1099mnCV.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
343 Richard Marcus, reporter for the subcommittee, detailed the status of the discussion and listed more than thirty ideas for rule amendments relating to electronic
discovery derived from the legal literature, the mini-conferences, and other sources.
Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of Electronic MateriaZ,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 253, 274-79. These preliminary
ideas for rules amendments have not been placed on the subcommittee or committee's agenda for formal consideration as of January 2002.
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effect on the discovery of computer-based evidence, as distinct from
3 44
discovery overall.
3.

Research Methods

FJC researchers surveyed magistrate judges during the summer of
2000 to identify recently closed cases in which electronic discovery was
prominent, in which the documents filed with the court were publicly
available for study, and in which the participants would likely be willing to be interviewed about their discovery experience. The survey
also gathered informal data on the frequency and type of problems
associated with electronic discovery. Approximately twenty cases were
identified as candidates for study. Researchers have studied and
coded discovery-related documents filed in these cases to identify
types of evidence sought, types of problems encountered, and rules
implicated. They have also developed interview protocols to elicit
data from both judges and counsel related to specific issues identified
by the subcommittee.
4. Findings and Linkage with Rules Proposals
As of January 2002, this project was still underway, and there are
no findings to report. Center staff expect to present a preliminary
report and analysis to the subcommittee in the autumn of 2002.
K

Class Actions-Study of the Effects of Amchem and Ortiz

1. Background
As part of its 1996 proposals to amend Rule 23, the Advisory Committee proposed to add as Rule 23(b) (4) a settlement class action,
that is, one in which "the parties to a settlement request certification
under subdivision (b) (3) for purposes of settlement, even though the
requirements of subdivision (b) (3) might not be met for purposes of
trial."3 45 While the proposal was pending, the Supreme Court de-

cided the case of Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 46 in which it reversed in part a Third Circuit opinion holding that the fact of
settlement was irrelevant to determining whether a class should be
certified under Rules 23(a) and 23(b) (3).347
"Settlement is relevant to a class certification," the Court held, in
that a district court confronted with a request for settlement-only class
344 See Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 342, at 28.
345 1996 PROPOSED RULES, supranote 255, reprintedin 167 F.R.D. 523, 559 (1996).
346 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
347 Id. at 609-11.

1186

NOTRE

DAME LAW

[VOL. 77:4

REVIEW

certification "need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems . . . for the proposal is that
there be no trial. '3 48 The Court went on to hold that "other specifica-

tions of the Rule-those designed to protect absentees by blocking
unwarranted or overbroad class definitions-demand undiluted, even
heightened, attention in the settlement context.

3 49

The Court ac-

knowledged the Advisory Committee's proposal to amend Rule 23 to
"expressly authorize settlement class certification," noted the "voluminous public comments-many of them opposed to, or skeptical of,
the amendment," and concluded that the Court would "consider the
35 0
Iscertification at issue under the Rule as it is currently framed."

sues relating to the validity of the proposed amendment were necessarily left for another day.
After the Court's decision, the Committee discussed the "difficulties and opportunities" presented by Amchem and by consensus decided to "defer further consideration of settlement classes."3 5 ' In
part, the Committee wished to "to gain the benefit of greater
35 2
experience."
After Amchem, the Supreme Court decided Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp.,3 53 which further restricted the ability of parties to settle mass

tort litigation on a global basis by interpreting narrowly Rule
23(b) (1) (B)'s applicability to limited fund settlements. 3 54 One commentator concluded, for example, that "the Supreme Court's decision
in Ortiz raises serious doubts about whether the Court would ever up3 55
hold a limited fund class action settlement of mass tort claims.
2.

Committee Request

Against this backdrop, the Advisory Committee faced the question of whether to revive its proposal to establish standards for settlement class actions that might be less restrictive than those imposed by
the Supreme Court. Anecdotal evidence supported conjecture that
the Rule 23 standards were having the effect of driving class actions
into state courts. To assist in its impending decision whether to rec348 Id. at 619-20.
349 Id. at 620.
350 Id. at 619.
351 Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Comm.,Judicial Conference of the U.S., Rule 23
(Oct. 6-7, 1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/cvlO-97.htm
(last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
352 Id.
353 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
354 See id. at 864-65.
355

GIBSON, supra note 49, at 28.
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ommend reviving the settlement class issue, in December 2001 the
subcommittee on class actions asked the Center to examine empirically the possible effects of Amchem, Ortiz, and related developments in
federal class action litigation on the filing and disposition of class actions in the federal courts.
3.

Research Methods

At the time of this writing, it is too soon to specify precisely the
research designs to be employed in carrying out this study. Two observational field designs are being given serious consideration. The
first would entail an electronic search of all docket entries for at least
two years before the Third Circuit decision in Amchem up to the end
of 2001 to identify class actions and determine any trends in the filing
of class actions in federal court in various types of cases. The second
design would involve surveying attorneys who have appeared in recently terminated class actions and ask about the effects of Amchem
and Ortiz on the ability to resolve on a global basis the issues that gave
rise to the litigation.
4. Findings and Linkage with Rules Proposals
There are no findings to date. The expectation is that the findings will be used to inform the threshold decision about whether or
not to revive the settlement class issue and draft a proposed rule.
Having detailed the major research efforts conducted at the request of the Advisory Committee, it seems appropriate to turn to an
analysis of the patterns revealed by these summary case histories.
Ill.

PATRNS AND PRACTICES IN USING EmPImcAL RESEARCH IN

CIvIL

RuLEMAKING

This Part reviews the research summaries presented in Part II and
discusses some patterns that emerge. It summarizes the timing, purposes, and types of the research and examines its impact in relation to
its intended purposes. Special attention will be paid to the relationship of the research to the rulemaking process, as well as to related
legislative activity.
A.

Type and Timing of Research

The first and clearest conclusion is that none of the research conducted was, or could reasonably have been, experimental. The closest
approximation was a retrospective quasi-experimental design for the
offer-of-judgment research, but even that design could not be consid-
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ered experimental in the sense of imposing prior controls that would
356
enable the results to support causal inferences.
Observational field studies using surveys were the most frequently
used research designs and methods. This combination was used in
eleven of the twelve completed studies, and the twelfth was a quasiexperimental field study that used survey methods. All twelve studies
were retrospective, that is, studying the effects of existing rules. A few
surveys (for example, discovery, Rule 68) included questions about
proposals. None focused on the prospective application of rules proposals that had not been adopted.
Typically the field studies started with electronic searches of
docket records to identify cases and records that were then studied in
depth. Three written surveys sought specific information about a responding attorney's experience in a recently-closed case. Another
sought attorneys' opinions at a general level, and three sought judges'
opinions at a general level. Telephone interviews of attorneys and
judges complemented case-file information in one study (special masters). Focus groups of potential class members supported the effort to
study and improve class action notices.
The timing of the research also followed a clear pattern. 35 7 Typically, the Center presented written research reports, sometimes in a
preliminary form, to the Advisory Committee within a year from the
date the Committee requested the work. For the twelve completed
projects described in Table 1, the average time from request to first
report was one year. The average time from request to final report
was 1.2 years. In all but one instance, the final report was delivered
within 1.5 years; in the one instance, the final report took two years.
Further use of the data continued, of course, as long as the Committee had a proposed rule under consideration. The Committee frequently asked researchers to address questions that arose during the
drafting and hearing stages. Databases created during the research
process presented a ready resource for responding to new questions.
Why did the Committee not request experimental research? The
conclusion seems unassailable that the time available to the
rulemakers for most empirical studies of matters of interest does not
356 In that study, Center researchers surveyed attorneys in cases that had settled
and compared their responses to those of attorneys in cases that had gone to trial.
Though the analysis is comparative, the assignment of cases to the two conditions is
not controlled, the vantage point is retrospective, and one cannot determine causal
relationships using such an approach. The research, of course, does not purport to
address causal relationships. See generally SHAPARD, supra note 35, at 3-5 (describing
survey construction, sampling, and analysis).
357 See iupra tbl.1.
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permit the use of controlled experiments on a prospective basis. We
have few examples from which to extract empirical data about the
time needed to conduct experimental research. Anecdotal information from the studies of CAMP-type procedures indicate that experimental research can consume between three and ten years. 358 Even
then, assuming that the empirical issues present close questionswhich should be the case, if the research and the consequent suspension of equal protection of the laws are to satisfy ethical norms discussed below 3 5 9-the results may be inconclusive and variable from
one court setting or local legal culture to another.
As the rulemaking process has evolved, generally a request for
research arises around the time the Chair of the Advisory Committee
or a critical mass of its membership have decided that a particular rule
is a prime candidate for amendment. Such intuitions generally arise
from personal experience, from the urgings of an interested constituency, or from a sense of urgency created by congressional action that
might preempt present and future rulemaking. Whatever the source,
requesting research makes sense, either to test the feasibility of and
support for a particular measure, or to accumulate the information
necessary to craft a workable rule. In the long run, having the ability
to obtain specialized research information helps the rulemakers develop a recognized expertise in drafting rules. Such a reputation may
in turn solidify congressional commitment to the Rules Enabling Act
8 60
process.
With requests for research coming from the Committee at the
same time as active efforts to revise the rules or to draft competing
statutes are underway, the pressure mounts to conduct what Center
researchers like to call "quick and clean" (as opposed to "quick and
dirty") research. An additional source of pressure flows directly from
the brief terms that Advisory Committee members and especially the
chair serve. In recent years, members of the Committee have been
appointed to three-year terms that may be renewed once. Chairs have
358 Recent examination of case management principle under the Civil Justice Reform Act adds another anecdote. While the study was not a controlled experiment, it
required many of the elements of an experiment, including complex design issues,
selecting courts for inclusion and for comparison, and monitoring the progress of
cases through the system. That study took approximately six years from the date of
the statute to the date of publication of the results of the study of ten pilot courts. See
generallyJAEs S. KAKALIK, TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAuRAL A. HILL, DANIEL MCCAFFERY,
JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OFJUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER
THE CVLJUSTICE REFORM

Aar (1996).

359 See infra notes 383-93 and accompanying text (outlining the ethics of
experimentation).
360 See infra notes 376-79.
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generally been appointed to a three-year term, with a possible oneyear extension.3 6 1 The term of the chair roughly equals the cycle for
rulemaking. Thus, "[a] Chair with a three-year term . . . can see a

project through only if it commences at the outset of his or her tenure. '3 62 To fit within that cycle, research must be reported to the
Committee within a year.
The discovery project, discussed in Part II.H, represents a good
example of the timing necessary to complete a rule revision within the
term of a single chair. Judge Niemeyer started the process in October
1996, and the revised rule went into effect on December 1, 2000. The
additional year beyond the ordinary three-year term afforded the
chair and the Committee barely enough time to explore the issues,
commission research, and conduct a conference before drafting and
publishing rules. Conducting an experiment could not possibly fit
into that time frame. If experimentation is to be considered, new approaches will have to be devised, as will be discussed in Part IV.
B.

Underlying Research Questions and Purposes

Research requests appear to have centered around three broad
types of questions. These questions typically relate to the purposes of
the undertaking. The three broad types of questions concern issues
relating to the frequency of certain practices, to the presence or absence of support for rule revision, and to the mechanical workings of
the current rules.
First, on several occasions, rulemakers have approached the
Center at the outset of a proposed rule change, though rarely before
the reporter has drafted a proposed amendment for internal Committee consideration. In this context, the Committee usually wishes to
obtain data that will help it decide whether the subject should be addressed in earnest. The Committee has asked how often a rule such as
Rule 12 (b) (6) has been used successfully, how summary judgment activity has changed (or not) over time, how much satellite litigation
accompanies Rule 11 activity, how much contested protective order
activity occurs, how often judges allow attorneys to participate in voir
dire, and how often special masters serve pretrial or post-trial roles. In
those instances, the research product may have helped the Committee
361 A self-study subcommittee of the long-range planning committee of the Judicial Conference recommended that the term for chairs of the advisory rules committees be extended to five years. SELF-STUDY, supra note 12, reprinted in 168 F.R.D. 679,
697 (1995). The recommendation "was discussed with the ChiefJustice on December
13, 1995." Id., reprinted in 168 F.R.D. 679, 681 (1995).
362 Id., reprinted in 168 F.R.D. 679, 697 (1995).
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decide whether to proceed and, if it decided to continue, how to define which provisions of a rule should be amended.
Occasionally, as in the Rule 12(b) (6) context, research results
may provide a reason not to proceed at all. More often, though, the
rulemaking process appears to have built momentum by the time the
research has been completed, as in the Rule 56 proposals, and empirical support for or against the Committee's approach may have little
effect.
Considerations of various sorts, ranging from pressure from
outside interest groups to the introduction of proposed legislation by
members of Congress, may have an impact on the Committee's need
for empirical research, as appears to have been the case in the studies
relating to protective orders and voir dire practices. In those instances, the Committee used the research to refine the issues. Using
empirical information about the workings of a rule can contribute to
demonstrating specialized knowledge and objectivity that in turn may
help the Committee withstand challenges to its exercise of Rules Enabling Act authority.
Occasionally, the Committee has decided after more extensive
work, at times with the direct intervention of the Judicial Conference,
to abandon an effort, as it did with Rule 68 offers ofjudgment, protective orders, and attorney participation in voir dire. Research probably
had some impact on the Rule 68 decision, but interest group activity
in opposition to Committee proposals seems to have dominated the
protective order and attorney participation in voir dire decisions.
These experiences suggest limits in the ability of empirical research
findings to insulate empirically grounded proposals from challenges
arising from other interests and values. Empirical data generally
ground specific proposals in reality, but data sometimes fail to illuminate the primary values at stake or the primary reason for taking action or not.
Giving prominence to nonempirically-supported values is to be
expected in a rulemaking process in which interest groups play an
important role. Even in those instances in which findings are rejected
for unquantified-and perhaps unquantifiable-reasons, empirical
research serves a purpose. When rulemakers have decided to depart
from an empirically-driven proposal, they generally have seen themselves as obligated to articulate reasons for doing so. For example, in
modifying the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a) (1) despite empirical research validating their effectiveness, the Committee chose to
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draft a proposal that might achieve a consensus and produce uniform3 63
ity of national rules.
Central to the purpose of conducting empirical research on disputed or doubtful propositions is the risk of turning up data that are
unwelcome. At times, such data may be incompatible with proposals
that the Committee developed before the research ended. Typically,
the research and the Committee's deliberations proceed simultaneously. Research data may or may not move the Committee away from
a proposal.
On at least one occasion, opponents of a proposed, published
rule cited Center research in opposition to the Committee's proposal.
That instance involved the so-called 'just ain't worth it" proposal regarding class actions, which would have called for judges to consider
"whether the probable relief to individual class members justifies the
costs and burdens of class litigation." 36 4 Numerous witnesses opposed
that provision. A small fraction of the opponents cited the FJC's finding that the median recovery per class member ranged from $315 to
$528 to support their arguments that most class actions provided ndntrivial recoveries to individual class members. 365 The Committee
abandoned the proposal.
Second, the Committee has with increasing frequency asked the
Center to develop a nuanced examination of how a particular rule
operates in the civil litigation context. These requests seem designed
to assist the Committee in deciding how, not whether, to amend a
rule. Examples include the Center's studies of Rule 11 sanctions, class
actions, discovery, and special masters. 366 On each occasion, the reporter has specified thoughts about the direction in which reform
might proceed and provided a roadmap for the research. Given this
degree of coordination, it is not surprising that many, but certainly
not all, of the research findings fit into the rulemaking plan. 36 7 Occasionally, as with the questions dealing with overlapping or duplicative
363 See supra notes 280-85 and accompanying text.
364 1996 PROPOSED RULES, supra note 255, reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 560, 559 (1996);
see also supranotes 242-44 and accompanying text (discussing the FJC finding regarding the size of claims).
365 For the reporter's summary of those comments, see 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra
note 229, at 331-50. See, for example, the summary of Alan Black's statement: "The
FJC study shows that if the '$2' claims class exists, it is very rare." Id. at 332.
366 See, e.g., FJC DISCOVERY PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS, supra note 273;
FJC SPECIAL MASTERS' STUDY, supra note 44; FJCDisclosure&Discovery Study, supra note
54.
367 Cf Maurice Rosenberg, FederalRules of Civil Procedurein Action: Assessing Their
Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2211 (1989) (discussing the importance of "the kind
of close working relationship between the researchers and the Rules Committee that
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class actions, aailable research tools may not always be able to match
the sweep of the empirical questions.
In discussing rules proposals that stirred serious challenges, one
should not overlook a function that contextual research may play in
responding to such challenges. Empirical research may give the Committee objective data to cite in support of its proposals. The Committee's use of Center data on initial disclosure to support the
amendments to the discovery rules that went into effect in 2000 represents a prime example, as discussed above.3 68 Though Rule 11
changes and class action proposals stirred heated debates, empirical
research presented answers to some objections from interest groups.
Third, sometimes the Committee has asked the Center to conduct research that appears to be designed to test the support for a
given proposal or a general approach to revising a rule. For example,
in asking the Center to survey all federal district judges to elicit their
views on Rule 11 sanctions, the Committee sought and obtained a
product that might have proved to be useful in steering its way
through a thicket of competing interests. At the least, no district
judge could argue that his or her views were not solicited. 369 Similarly, in considering the question of whether to expand attorney participation in voir dire, the Committee was caught between competing
interests of districtjudges and influential members of Congress. Consulting the judges and documenting their practices seemed a necessary, but as it turned out not a sufficient, step in seeking Judicial
370
Conference support.
Research on Rule 68 offers of judgment provides another example in which a specific proposal needed the test of outside review. Exploring the effects of a complicated formula in the context of an
already complex set of fee-shifting rules seemed indispensable to further action. A controlled field experiment may have been a viable way
to test the effects of the proposal. In the absence of such an experiment, uncovering attorneys' strong views for and against the proposals
the discovery project had" and indicating that "[f] or the most productive results, that
type of relationship is essential").
368 See supraPart II.H.4.a.
369 See supra notes 131-37, 141-44 and accompanying text (analyzing two surveys
of judges). Ironically, dissenting justices argued that the committee had ignored
those views. See supranote 135. In hindsight, however, the 1993 amendments appear
to have reflected accurately the views of most district judges on all but one point. See
FJC 1995 RuLE 11 SURVEY, supranote 141, at 2 (listing the single exception as a majority preference for the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions to include compensation of parties injured by Rule 11 as well as deference).
370 See supra notes 209-22 and accompanying text (discussing voir dire findings
and outcome).

1194

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 77:4

may have provided the information the Committee needed. The
Committee had once before withdrawn a Rule 68 amendment after
intense partisan criticism, 3

71

and the Center's research helped corrob-

orate the likelihood of a recurrence. We are left to speculate whether
the interest groups might have altered their position had there been
clear empirical data derived from a controlled experiment.
What impact has empirical research had? Do the rulemakers find
it useful? That itself is an empirical question, best addressed by an
objective observer outside the Center. The case summaries in Part II
shed considerable light on the issue by using references to empirical
work found in the minutes of meetings and in the official Committee
notes. Based on those objective references and my subjective impressions, the following represents a starting point for assessing the impact
of empirical research in the rulemaking process.
In general, empirical research appears to have had a substantial
impact on the drafting of amended rules. As noted earlier, empirical
research also has had an impact on Committee decisions on whether
to proceed, in whole or in part, with proposed rule revisions. Turning
to the fourteen instances in which the Advisory Committee requested
that the Center conduct research, six of the rulemaking efforts ended
with a Committee decision not to proceed with the proposed rulemaking. 372 Of the remaining eight requests (involving five rules), four
studies provided data that were used in drafting amendments that
went into effect. 373 Three studies and part of another relate to pend-

ing rules proposals regarding class actions, special masters, and electronic discovery.
For example, empirical research has had, in my opinion, a substantial impact in the discovery rule revision that took effect on December 1, 2000. The highest impact seemed to be in the area of
disclosure. The Center's findings appeared to counter the misimpression, based on presentations from some interest groups, that disclosure rules were not working well. In addition, Center findings on
problems of discovery, which appeared to be concentrated in the 5%
of cases with the highest stakes and amount of discovery, dovetailed
with the Committee's approach to identifying the relatively few cases
371

See Rowe & Vidmar, supra note 175, at 15; Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule

68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 10-16 (1985).

372 Those subjects were Rule 12(b) (6) motions to dismiss, Rule 56 (summary judgment), reexamination of 1993 amendments to Rule 11 sanctions, Rule 26(c) (protective orders), Rule 68 (offers ofjudgment), and Rule 47(a) (attorney participation in
voir dire). See supra Parts III.A, III.D, III.E, and III.F.
373 Those subjects were Rule 11 (two studies), Rule 23(f) (part of one study), and
Rules 26-37. See supra Parts III.C and III.F.
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that might require judicial management of discovery. In addition,
Center data on the working of discovery limitations provided an ongoing resource that the reporters and members called on to inform decisions about where to draw the line. This was particularly true
regarding the length of depositions. The Committee also used Center
data on the numbers of depositions and the absence of reported
problems with the number of depositions as part of its decision to
leave existing limits intact.
Center research has had a notable impact in certain other areas,
sometimes confirming a direction the Committee had already chosen
and perhaps contributing data that refined proposals already formulated. For example, in the Rule 11 area, Center findings seemed for
the most part to confirm conventional wisdom about satellite litigation, monetary sanctions, and disparate impact on plaintiffs. Data on
the absence of hearings in a substantial number of cases may have led
to more explicit hearing requirements, a matter that otherwise might
have been left unstated. In the attorney voir dire, class action, and
special master areas, Center data appear to have had an identifiable
effect, as described in Part II.
Of the projects in which Center research has delved into the context of how a rule operates or a proposed rule might operate, only the
study of Rule 68 offers ofjudgment might be considered to have had a
low impact. That, however, seems to be a hindsight judgment based
on knowledge that the Committee abandoned the proposal. The FJC
study did provide the Committee with information supporting its decision not to proceed in the face of strong opposing forces on both
sides, a contribution that seems significant.
The Advisory Committee has been selective in requesting empirical research. During the time span covered by this Article, numerous
changes recommended by the Committee went into effect without
special empirical study.3 74 Clearly, the Committee has exercisedjudg374 Such changes include nontrivial revisions to: Rule 4 regarding service of process (120 S.Ct. 50, 72-74 (1999); 113 S.Ct. 88, 92-105 (1992)); Rule 5 regarding certificate of service, filing by facsimile, and filing of disclosures (120 S.Ct. 50, 74 (1999);
116 S.Ct. 74, 82 (1995); 111 S.Ct. 579, 683-85 (1990)); Rule 9 regarding admiralty
provisions (117 S.Ct. 76, 85 (1996)); Rule 12(a) regarding presentation of motions to
dismiss (120 S.Ct. 50, 74 (1999); 113 S.Ct. 88, 280-82 (1992)); Rule 15 regarding
amended pleadings (111 S.Ct. 579, 689-90 (1996)); Rule 16 regarding pretrial conferences (113 S.Ct. 88, 284-88 (1992)); Rule 26 regarding initial disclosures (113

S.Ct. 88, 293-314 (1992)); Rule 43(a) regarding form of taking testimony (116 S.Ct.
74, 83-84 (1995)); Rule 44(a) (2) regarding proof of foreign records (111 S.Ct. 579,
701-10 (1990)); Rule 45 regarding subpoenas (111 S.Ct. 579, 71.1-22 (1990)); Rule
47(b) regarding alternatejurors (111 S.Ct. 579, 730-31 (1990)); Rule 50(a) regarding
judgment as a matter of law (111 S.Ct. 579, 733-38 (1990)); Rule 54(d) regarding
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ment in calling on the FJC's limited resources. No explicit criteria
have been developed for distinguishing rulemaking proposals that
need careful study and those that do not. Nor does there appear to
be a need to establish criteria that might crimp the development of an
evolving process. Suffice it to say that by reviewing the research requests at a general level, the primary factors appear to be the paucity
of empirical information about a subject, and a need to know more
about the empirical context in which a complex rule operates.37 5
C. A Note on Legislation
To the degree that basing procedural rules on empirical analysis
is an important value for our civil justice system, the experiences described in this Article strongly suggest that the rulemaking process has
a decided advantage over the legislative process. Congressional deference to the rulemaking process appears to have been the dominant
mode for dealing with the proposals discussed in this Article. Of the
fourteen rulemaking instances examined in this Article, ten involved
legislative activity at some stage of the rulemaking process.3 76 In only
one instance during the period covered by this Article (1988-2001)
did Congress adopt legislation-the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 377-that altered the operation of an existing rule. In that
instance, Congress created special class action rules, but limited the
operation of the new rules to the subject matter of private securities
378
litigation.
Of course, empirical analysis of the questions deemed most important by the rules committees should not be and does not appear to
have been the sole determinant of whether Congress might defer to
attorneys' fees (113 S.Ct. 88, 384-86 (1992)); Rule 83(a) regarding local rules (115
S.Ct. 71, 83-84 (1994)); Rule B regarding attachment and garnishment (120 S.Ct. 50,
77-81 (1999)); and Rule C regarding in rem actions (120 S.Ct. 50, 77-81 (1999); 111
S.Ct. 579, 760-62 (1990)).
375 Those implicit criteria and others may be gleaned from Cooper, supra note
237, and Cooper, supra note 317.
376 There was no evidence that Congress had conducted or commissioned any
empirical examination of the issues that were pending simultaneously before Congress and the Advisory Committee. A closer look at the legislative process might reveal such research, but none appears to have been communicated to the rulemakers
and none was uncovered by this author in the course of conducting research for the
Advisory Committee on many of the subjects discussed in Part II above.
377 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77a (1994)). The statute modified the conditions for management and certification
of class actions in securities litigation, altering the application of Rule 23 to such
cases.
378 Id.
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new or amended rules. For many reasons, including a congressional
commitment to the Rules Enabling Act process that it created, Congress might be expected to defer to the rulemaking process, at least in
areas that fall fairly clearly on the "procedural" side of the long recognized if difficult-to -apply "procedural-substantive" distinction within
the rulemaking process. 379 Any deference shown by Congress cannot
be attributed solely to the rulemaking body's capacity to commission
and use empirical research. Congress, no less than the rules committee, might be expected to rely on personal experiences and impressions communicated by colleagues, witnesses, and others. As
discussed above, 38 0 Congress came close to rejecting the proposed
amendments to Rule 11 sanctions, which were based on empirical
data, and to Rule 26 regarding initial disclosure in 1993, which were
not based on empirical data. In those instances, the proposed congressional action did not appear to turn on the presence or absence of
empirical research.

IV.

EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS

To recapitulate, commentators have called for more experimental research to support the rulemaking process. 38 ' Dramatic increases
in empirical research to support the rulemaking process have occurred in the past decade or so, 38 2 but none of that empirical work
involved experimental research. Yet, experimental research indisputably affords the most powerful instrument for examining legal procedures, the only design that many researchers rely on to support causal
inferences. This Part discusses some of the limits of experimental research before presenting a proposal for a revision of the Rules Enabling Act designed to make the rulemaking process more open to
experimental research.
379 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015 (1982) (examining the development of rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act).
380 See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
381 See supra Part ILF, notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
382 In 1988, Professor Laurens Walker counted thirty empirical studies related to
rulemaking that had been conducted during the first fifty years of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, a rate of slightly more than one study every other year. Walker,
supra note 8, at 69-70. During the twelve years since then, the Center itself has conducted at least twelve studies directly related to the federal rules, a rate of one per
year, and certainly other research institutions have contributed a considerable number of studies. For example, see the studies supported by RAND and the American
Judicature Society in supranotes 16, 41, 123, and 358; see also sources cited supra note
25 (discussing laboratory and other research).
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Aside from the time and cost required for experimental research,
matters of principle limit the judicial branch's willingness and ability
to use these designs. A fundamental premise of our legal systemembedded in the Equal Protection Clause, expressly in the Fourteenth Amendment and implicitly in the Fifth Amendment, as well as
in our collective notions of fundamental fairness3 83-is that like cases
will be treated in like manner. To examine closely the conditions
under which legal experimentation might legitimately take place,
Chief Justice Warren Burger, serving in his capacity as Chairman of
the Board of the FJC, appointed a blue-ribbon Advisory Committee on
Experimentation in the Law.38 4 The Chief Justice directed the Committee to examine "the propriety, value and effectiveness of controlled experimentation for evaluating innovations in the justice
385
system."
The Center's Advisory Committee produced a comprehensive
analysis of the conditions under which experimentation might be considered and the terms under which it might be implemented. Without going into the intricacies of the ethical analyses, it is useful to
restate the preconditions posited by the Committee before a judicial
body would be justified in authorizing an experiment involving a component of the legal system:
(1) The current rule or practice "must either need substantial improvement or be of doubtful effectiveness" and should not simply be an experiment "for experiment's sake." 38 6 Amendments
to conform the rules to contemporary practices or to ordain the
best practices for judges to follow probably would not qualify
under that standard. 38 7 Nonetheless, such rule changes might
benefit from empirical research to identify and examine the
practices in a litigation context and search for potential side
effects. If the practice has been adopted in many courts, there
is less concern about delaying a good idea but greater concern
383 See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 16-17. This is not to say, of course, that our
legal system, based as it is on federalism, does not tolerate differences between state
and federal procedural rules that allow like cases to be treated differently.

384 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 20, at 79.
385 Id.
386 Id. at 11.
387 See, for example, the 2001 proposals to change Rule 23 (c) (1) (A)'s treatment
of the timing of class certification activity. The Committee note describes the change
as "consistent with the reality that courts generally make certification decisions after
the deliberation required for .a sound decision, as shown by the Federal Judicial
Center figures" and also as "consistent with best practice." 2001 PROPOSED RULES,
supra note 232, rerinted in 201 F.R.D. 560, 592 (2001); see also supra notes 250-54
(discussing "as soon as practicable" findings).
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about denying the benefits of that idea in an unknown number
of cases.
(2) There must be "significant uncertainty about the value of the
proposed innovation." 38 8 Just as in medical research, one
would not withhold a known successful treatment from a sick or
dying patient, one should not withhold a known beneficial legal
procedure from a litigant. For example, once the Second Circuit determined that CAMP produced beneficial results without
38 9
countervailing detriments, the court adopted the program.
Some courts determined that the research results from the
CAMP experiment sufficed to justify adoption of similar programs. In the Sixth Circuit, an earlier evaluation of an existing
program had "proved inconclusive," and the court decided to
pursue an experiment to test the benefits of the program in
relationship to its costs.39 0 When a procedure is mandated by
the Constitution or by a statute, adopting a rule to implement
that procedure need not be tested by experiment.
(3) There must be "no other practical means to resolve uncertainties about the effectiveness of the proposed innovation." 391 In
other words, "if essential information can be obtained satisfactorily through simulation or other forms of research that do not
directly affect the operation of the justice system, considera3 92
tions of ethics... militate against a program experiment."
For example, obtaining information about the operation of the
discovery and disclosure systems by surveying counsel or judges
in recently terminated cases might be seen as a less intrusive
393
alternative to employing experimental designs.
(4) Finally, "the experiment must seriously be intended to inform a
future choice between retaining the status quo or implementing the innovation."39 4 If adoption of the proposed rule appears not to be feasible because of considerations of cost,
political opposition, or other impediments, conducting an experiment should not be used to temporize or otherwise delay
an inevitable decision to adopt or reject the rule. On the other
hand, if conducting a needed experiment requires several years
of study, opposition to the merits of the proposed innovation
CI., supra note 20, at 11.
supra note 31, at 1.

388
389
390
391

FED. JUDICIAL

392

Id.

EAGLIN,

'

Id. & n.1 (adopting Local Rule 18).
CM., supra note 20, at 11.

FED. JUDICIAL

393 See supra notes 272-74 (discussing FJC research methods in discovery and disclosure study).
394 FED. JUDICIAL CM., supra note 20, at 11.

1200

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 77:4

should not require the proponents to draw back from an experiment to test the merits.
Thus, the conditions under which rulemakers might employ experimental research limit the likelihood of its use. In addition to being costly and time-consuming, experimental research must clear
ethical hurdles that are not insignificant. The cumulative effect of
those constraints may help explain the infrequency of its use.
Part III included discussion of the institutional limits on longterm research imposed by the brief terms served by members and
chairs of advisory committees. In the research summarized in Part II,
the Committee seemed to have a clear vision of the types of changes
that would be desirable. When the chair and members of a committee have such clear vision of the need for change and the types of
changes that might work, current methods of "quick and clean" observational survey research seem appropriate and to have served the
Committee well. When, however, an innovative idea has unclear consequences, the Committee may wish to adopt an experimental
3 95

approach.
The proposal considered recently by the Advisory Committee to
create a simplified set of procedures for specific sets of cases presents
an example of this type of innovation. The proposal would apply
truncated pretrial procedures and an early, firm trial date to cases
seeking less than a specified amount of damages. 39 6 Some of the
many unknowns about such a proposal would be how many cases
might come within any mandatory categories, how many people
would use it within any voluntary categories, and what problems litigants, attorneys, and courts might encounter when using it. Research
designs traditionally used to support the rulemaking processes would
not adequately detect such problems. Survey research would of necessity present totally hypothetical questions and would most likely re395 The Rule 68 offer of judgment proposals, for example, may also have been
good candidates for experimental testing. The method of randomizing and controlling the application of the proposed rule would require some creative design work,
but the proposals could have undoubtedly benefited from field experience. Coming
up with an outcome measure that would distinguish between coerced and voluntary
settlements would also require creative design work. Forum-shopping issues, of
course, always plague such research, posing analytical problems about whether random selection of participants was successfully implemented. Had these methodological problems been overcome, experimental testing and reliable data might have
softened some of the opposition that Rule 68 proposals have generated. See supra
notes 194-99 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 68 proposals and outcome).
Proposed electronic discovery rules may also be candidates for experimental testing.
See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
396 See Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 325, at 32-38.
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present an attempt to quantify variables that are primarily matters of
opinion at best, conjecture at worst. There appear to be no existing
systems in the federal courts that employ the proposed package of
rules.
In the Committee's discussion about simplified procedures, this
author raised the question of implementing the proposed procedures
on an experimental basis.3 97 To date, the Committee has not pursued
that approach, perhaps for the same reasons it decided not to pursue
the simplified procedure mechanism at all. The item remains on the
Committee's agenda as of this writing. Assuming for purposes of
discussion that the Committee might wish to test its proposed innovation, two fundamental reasons might inhibit pursuing an experimental approach. The first is that there does not appear to be any explicit
authority for the rulemakers to issue rules that are of less than national scope. The second is that there is no mechanism in place for
creating and administering national experiments.
As to the question of authority, the Rules Enabling Act vests in
the judicial branch "the power to prescribe general rules of practice
and procedure."3 98 The core meaning of the term "general" would
seem to preclude having inconsistent rules apply within different
courts.3 99 Yet such inconsistent application of rules is central to experimental testing of proposed rules under controlled conditions.
An argument can be made that the inherent power of the courts
to govern their own affairs includes the power to create experimental
rules that are being tested in a limited number of districts. 40 0 In effect, the 1993 "opt-out" provisions of Rule 26(a) created such a situa397

See id. at 36-37.

398 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994).
399 See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules To Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure,137 U. PA.
L. REV. 2067, 2079 (1989) ("'[G]eneral' should be presumed to mean that rules...
should not be limited in their application ... to a particular geographic area.").
400 For an argument that Article III of the Constitution vests general rulemaking
power in the federal courts, see Linda S. Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking: The
CivilJustice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MnN. L. REV. 1283 (1993). For a
contrary view, see Martin H. Redish, FederalJudicialIndependence: Constitutional and
Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 724-31 (1995), and for a rebuttal, see
Linda S. Mullenix, JudicialPower and The Rules EnablingAct, 46 MERCER L. REV. 733
(1995). This debate took place in the context of the CivilJustice Reform Act of 1990,
28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994), in which Congress explicitly authorized local district
courts to study various approaches to reducing costs and delays. Congress also explicitly created pilot and demonstration courts that were to study specific programs in a
systematic way. See §§ 104-105 of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, 104 Stat. 5097.
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tion, albeit without any national control over the local decisionmaking
process. The inherent authority argument, however, calls for acting
in the face of the statutory limit that rules be of general applicability.
That, in turn, raises the question of whether Congress has the power
to limit the rulemaking authority, 40 1 a point that is beyond the scope
of this Article.
An argument can also be made that the Judicial Conference has
the power to create experimental rules as part of its statutory duty to
"carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the gen-402
eral rules of practice and procedure now or hereafter in use ....
Indeed, the "now or hereafter in use" language suggests authority to
study proposed rules that the Judicial Conference has not put into
effect.
On the other hand, commentators have urged that creating an
explicit process for testing experimental rules should be done in conjunction with Congress, through legislative action. 40 3 Given the overlap in power and jurisdiction over procedural issues between Congress
and the rulemakers, creating explicit statutory authority to conduct
experiments appears to be the prudent course. The examples of overlapping rule and statutory proposals encountered in Part II reveal that
Congress has repeatedly deferred to the Rules Enabling Act process it
created. Congress would presumably be more likely to defer to the
experimental process if it had played a role in its creation than if the
courts were to proceed unilaterally.
As to the question of the mechanism for adopting and monitoring experimental rules, no organized system exists. Commentators
have presented proposals to create such a system, 40 4 but such proposals have posited local rules and individual local district courts as the
catalysts and proving grounds for experimentation. Indeed, manyperhaps too many-innovations originate at the district and even the
chambers level. The question, however, is whether such uncontrolled
"experiments" should be adopted on a national level. Local districts
or chambers are not in a position to evaluate the workings of their
rules under controlled conditions. As Professor Leo Levin, former Director of the FJC, observed, district courts may be serving as "very busy
401 See generally Burbank, supra note 379 (examining congressional authority over
rulemaking).
402 28 U.S.C. § 331.
403 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 11, at 1585-86 (discussing a proposal for experimentation by local rule); Tobias, supra note 11, at 286 (discussing a proposal for Judicial
Conference approval of experimental local rules).
404 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 11, at 1590-93 (commentary on assuring productive
systems); Walker, supra note 8, at 76.
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laboratories.., but virtually no one is collecting data." 40 5 In addition,
data from local courts that have voluntarily adopted an innovation
may have acted out of an idiosyncratic local legal culture. Other
courts may not see themselves as similarly situated. Data from such
local experiments may simply not be applicable on a national level.
Professor Levin recommended creating a new committee of the
Judicial Conference to supervise and administer a program of experimentation that would involve both reviewing proposals brought to the
committee as well as pursuing "initiatives suggested by the committee." 40 6 Taking Professor Levin's proposal to its logical conclusion
would entail creating or empowering a national body, a component of
the Judicial Conference, to formulate and adopt experimental rules to
be tested on a national level. Because the function of reviewing and
approving experimental rules rests so heavily on skills already used
effectively by the Standing Committee with the assistance of the advisory committees, the proper locus of the power would seem to reside
in the Standing Committee. Designing a new entity seems likely lead
to competing claims for authority to draft and promulgate national
rules.
Vesting the power to review proposed experiments in the Standing Committee; or any national body would be likely to exacerbate the
tension between the value of uniform national rulemaking and the
value of autonomy for local courts to administer and manage their
own caseloads. Randomly assigning a court to test an experimental
treatment can be expected to impose demands on that court's resources. Those demands may lead those courts to seek to opt out of a
proposed experiment. Opting out, however, defeats the principle of
random assignment. Without attempting to resolve this dilemma, it is
important to note that the federal courts' tradition of local autonomy
represents another hurdle to conducting experimental research on a
national level.
As shown earlier, expressions of interest in experimental testing
of proposed rules have been rare and episodic to date. Ethical constraints circumscribe the opportunities for experimentation even further. There is no reason to expect that a mechanism for creating
405 Levin, supra note 11, at 1581-82. Professor Tobias suggests congressional
adoption of a 1991 proposal to amend Rule 83 to permit experimental local rules if
approved by the Judicial Conference. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 286. For the proposed 1991 amendment to Rule 83, which was not adopted, see COMM.ONRULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED

RULES,

reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 152-55 (1991). A proposed experimental local rule would
be limited to a period of five years or less. Id., reprintedin 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991).
406 Levin, supra note 11, at 1589-90.
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national rule-based experiments would be used so frequently that it
would tax the capacity of the Standing Committee and its advisory
committees. Accordingly, what is needed is a statute that would vest
the power to create experimental rules in the Standing Committee. If
the demand exceeds the capacity of the Standing Committee, that
would be the appropriate time to consider other alternatives.
In summary, moving from the rhetorical calls for experimental
research into the reality of implementing experimental research demands an operational mechanism for suggesting, reviewing, implementing, and monitoring rule-based experiments. 40 7 Such a
mechanism needs to be created at a national level and to have expertise in rulemaking. With appropriate authority from Congress and assistance from the FJC and the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, the Standing Committee could serve those functions.
In a common-law fashion, the Committee would develop expertise in
identifying appropriate subjects for experimentation, establishing
means of randomly selecting courts to participate, reviewing proposed
research designs, selecting control groups, setting time limits on the
experiments, and reviewing the data. Such a mechanism could draw
on infrequently-used experimental research tools that can enhance
our knowledge of the impact of proposed rules on litigants, attorneys,
and courts.
Creating such a mechanism will require that rulemakers shift
their expectations about the timing of major rules changes. Members
and chairs might serve as catalysts for long-term projects that their
successors will pick up and conclude. This change in roles would allow the committees, in appropriate situations, to contemplate calling
for experimental testing of controversial proposals before enacting a
new national rule. Having such a mechanism would present another
option for coping with proposed rules changes, proposals that offer
no empirical basis for conclusions about their expected effects.
Reserving experimental study for significant and debatable rule
changes coincides with ethical limitations on experimentation in the
law. Using experimentation sparingly also promotes conservation of
scarce rulemaking and research resources. On those occasions when
the Standing Committee finds experimental research on proposed
rules appropriate, the end result should be highly likely to improve
both the quality of rules adopted and the quality of our knowledge of
the justice system.

407

See supra notes 358-64 and accompanying text.

